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CONTRACTS AND THE REQUIREMENT OF 
CONSIDERATION: POSITING A UNIFIED NORMATIVE 
THEORY OF CONTRACTS, INTER VIVOS AND 
TESTAMENTARY GIFT TRANSFERS 
ALEX M. JOHNSON, JR.* 
ABSTRACT 
 
This Article addresses a subject that has mystified generations of 
Contracts students: the normative basis for “consideration.”  Instead of 
attempting to define consideration, which can be largely tautological, the 
focus is on the normative basis for its use in deciding which contracts are 
enforceable.  After examining the four major normative theories that have 
been put forth to date to explain the requirement of consideration: 
functional, realist, moral, and efficiency, the Article conclude that 
functional is the best normative theory mandating the use of consideration 
in enforceable contracts. 
The Article compares enforceable contracts in which consideration is 
found with transactions in other legal areas, that is, valid inter vivos gifts 
and Wills (Property and Trusts and Estates), to determine what 
requirements are necessary to validate those transfers.  With respect to both 
of these latter transfers, functional formalities are required that satisfy 
evidentiary, channeling, ritualistic, and protective functions—the same 
functions that are satisfied by the consideration doctrine in Contracts. 
The Article then details why these formalities are so important and cut 
across these transactions in different areas of the law.  By expanding the 
analysis to the adjudication phase of the legal process, the critical role these 
functions play ex post allows the court or other arbiter to make a 
determination regarding the enforceability of a transaction with low 
administrative costs and with little attendant error costs.  In two of the three 
transactions, inter vivos gifts and testamentary (Will) transfers, inevitably 
one of the parties (the putative donor) to the transaction is deceased.  In the 
third, arms-length contracts, the two parties to the putative contract have 
two different stories regarding the formation of that contract which, in the 
 
* James C. Slaughter Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Virginia Law School, 
Director for the Center of the Study of Race and Law, University of Virginia School of Law.  I 
thank Kristen Glover for her excellent research assistance.  Any remaining faults are my own. 
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absence of the functional formalities, would be indeterminate.  The 
functional formalities thus provide the arbiter with reliable and crucial 
information ex post to guide the decision-maker’s resolution of the question 
of enforceability. 
Finally, the outlier transaction that has bedeviled Contract scholars for 
generations and which requires no consideration—promises enforced as a 
result of the use of the doctrine of promissory estoppel—is addressed and 
analyzed.  It is theorized that these cases actually represent three different 
types of transactions—failed gift cases, promissory fraud cases, and pre-
contractual promise cases (based on fact patterns similar to those employing 
the doctrine of culpa en contrahendo in Civil Law countries).  
Disaggregating these cases, it is demonstrated that only the latter, pre-
contractual promise cases, are true contract cases calling for the imposition 
of the same normative basis as contract cases supported by consideration.  
Hence, the article concludes by demonstrating that the contract cases that 
are enforceable per the doctrine of estoppel or reliance supply the courts 
with the same functional formalities as consideration-based agreements.  
These enforceable reliance cases provide the courts with an efficient and 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The concept of consideration in contract law has always been 
something of a mystery.  As it has evolved over centuries to mean one thing 
instead of another in contract formation, it has primarily served as the line 
of demarcation between those contracts that are enforceable by courts and 
those not.  Indeed, given the central role played by the doctrine of 
consideration in contract formation, one would think that its definition and 
contours would be fixed and resolute for academics, judges and lawyers 
alike.  Ah, but that is not the case.  Quite the contrary, the doctrine of 
consideration is highly contestable and very malleable.  Some might even 
contend that the doctrine of consideration is subjective and tautological.1  
And none of these latter contentions are verifiably wrong. 
What is absolutely and irrefutably true is that consideration, however 
defined, is a requirement for enforceable contracts.2  That requirement is 
 
1.  For further discussion of this issue, see infra notes 39-45 and accompanying text. 
2.  As with most broad statements or principles of law, the statement is both over and under 
inclusive.  Certain agreements lacking consideration are indeed enforced using the doctrines of 
estoppel and reliance. See infra Part V. Certain other agreements, which are allegedly supported 
by consideration, are, however, deemed unenforceable because they violate public policy.  See, 
e.g., A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000) (court refused to enforce agreement to transfer 
embryos to ex-wife following a divorce).  On the other hand, I contend that A.Z. v. B.Z. does not 
involve an enforceable contract or agreement and should instead be viewed like any other intra-
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hornbook law drummed into the head of every first year law student and 
known to every competent (and even an incompetent) lawyer.  Determining 
whether consideration was present – in which case the contract is 
enforceable – in a dispute between two parties often becomes the first and 
most important question that courts address in contractual disputes.3  But 
determining what constitutes enforceable consideration and when it is 
required  to have an enforceable agreement is perplexing.  Knowing that 
consideration is required to have an enforceable contract is one thing; 
however, defining it and determining when there is or is not consideration is 
the subject of thousands of cases and the content of much law review 
fodder.4 
For contract law, this means that one of its primary tenets—a 
foundational building block—in deciphering and resolving issues that arise 
in voluntary agreements between two or more parties or entities is 
“functional” at best,5 illusory at worst.  Often based on criteria that are 
unstated and obtuse, it allows judges and other mediators to arbitrarily 
decide which contracts are or are not enforceable with the imprimatur of the 
state.  Consequently, given its central and important gatekeeping role in 
contract law, it is unsurprising that scores of articles and treatises have been 
authored to examine, address, and define the purpose, scope, and role of 
consideration in contract law.6  Thus, to some students of the law, the 
 
family promise, that is, as gratuitous.  See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The Legality of Contracts 
Governing the Disposition of Embryos: Unenforceable Intra-Family Agreements 43 SW. L. REV. 
191 (2013) (article demonstrates that although Consideration is present in intrafamily contracts 
governing the disposition of embryos upon divorce or separation, these contracts are not enforced 
due to public policy and other concerns). 
3.  See, e.g., JEFF FERRIELL, UNDERSTANDING CONTRACTS ¶3.01, at 63 (2d ed. 2009); 
BRUCE W. FRIER & JAMES WHITE, THE MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS 35 (3d ed. 2015). 
4.  See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Principles of Consideration, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 
640 (1982); Lon Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUMBIA L. REV. 799 (1941); James D. 
Gordon III., A Dialogue About the Doctrine of Consideration, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 987 (1990) to 
name a few. 
5.  Meaning functional in the sense that an adjudicating court will make the determination of 
whether consideration is present based on the underlying and unstated decision to enforce or not 
enforce the agreement.  See infra notes 27-36.  Consideration thus serves the function of the 
“on/off” switch demarcating which contracts are viable.  If the court wants, for whatever reason, 
to enforce the agreement, it will find “consideration.”  See FERRIELL, supra note 3.  Conversely, if 
the court finds the agreement lacking in whatever respect, it can choose not to enforce same by 
deciding that there is an absence of consideration.  Id.  This view tracks the “realist’s” normative 
view of consideration discussed below.  See infra notes 37-45 and accompanying text. 
6.  See, e.g., Morris Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1933); Fuller, 
supra note 4; Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the 
Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Principles of 
Consideration, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 640 (1982); Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond 
Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the “Invisible Handshake,” 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903 
(1985); Randy E. Barnett & Mary E. Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estoppel, Contract 
Formalities, and Misrepresentations, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 443 (1987). 
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requirement of consideration to establish an enforceable contract remains a 
mystery. 
Yet, none of these excellent and informative articles adequately explain 
the normative and functional roles of consideration once the focus on 
consideration is expanded to explore and explain related doctrines and cases 
addressed in other areas of the law, like property law and trust and estate 
law, where voluntary transfers that are lacking consideration (however it is 
defined) are enforced by the courts.7  In other words, once the focus on the 
function of consideration is expanded to analyze related and symbiotic 
doctrines, such as gifts and the testamentary transfer of assets where 
consideration is not required, the definition and role of consideration in 
contract law again becomes even more confusing and contestable.8 
This expansion leads to the two seminal issues addressed in this 
Article: 1) what is the normative basis for the requirement of consideration 
in enforceable contracts and 2) why is consideration lacking in other 
enforceable agreements like inter vivos gifts and testamentary transfers?  
The search for a normative basis for consideration, however, is not a novel 
undertaking.  As one might imagine, since consideration has been required 
to enforce voluntary agreements since well before the promulgation of the 
Restatement (First) of Contracts in 1931,9 an examination of the normative 
basis of consideration has been fair game for contract law scholars.  Hence, 
scholars who address the normative basis for the use and function of 
consideration to establish an enforceable agreement are not writing on a 
blank slate.  As a result, Part II of this Article begins by briefly 
summarizing the appropriate literature that establishes the four primary 
normative theories supporting the use and function of consideration to find 
enforceable contracts.  The four normative theories can be roughly and 
rather broadly be characterized as: 1) functional or formal; 2) realist; 3) 
moral; and 4) efficiency (law and economics). 
To demonstrate that the functional or formal role is the appropriate and 
best normative paradigm by which to evaluate consideration, Part II 
 
7.  These are gratuitous transfers but it should be noted at the outset that these gratuitous 
transfers are enforced by the courts.  The old shibboleth that gratuitous transfers are not enforced 
is erroneous and misleading.  Gratuitous promises that are not completed are not enforced.  This is 
discussed in greater detail below.  See infra, notes 113-114 and accompanying text. 
8.  One insight gleaned from my analysis of this issue is how different transfers are treated 
legally simply because the transfer is cabined in one area of the law, for example, Trusts and 
Estates which regulates testamentary gift transfers, versus another area of law, say inter vivos gift 
transfers that is regulated by rules in Property Law. 
9.  Indeed, and as discussed infra notes 62-86 and accompanying text, with respect to the 
operation and use of Seal to establish enforceable agreements at common law, consideration was 
required at common law for informal agreements not requiring a Seal in order to produce an  
enforceable agreement. 
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addresses the current definition of consideration in the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, paying some attention to its historical progress 
beginning with the development and use of the “Seal” as a variant of 
consideration at common law.10  In tracing its evolution, particular attention 
is paid to the functional or formal role performed by the doctrine of 
consideration and related doctrines that are used to validate non-
consideration based transfers such as donative transfers.11  This ground has 
largely been ploughed by other scholars but must be rehearsed to set the 
stage for what follows. 
By comparing consideration-based contracts to gratuitous transfers, 
however, this Article demonstrates that through employing the “benefit or 
detriment test” to determine whether there is consideration, the current 
“bargain theory” of consideration is highly chimerical and illusory at best.12  
Once the distinction between consideration-based contracts and gratuitous 
transfers is deconstructed,13 the only normative basis for consideration and 
its use in contract law is to provide a functional or formal role.  Given the 
status of the parties, strangers or acquaintances in the contract setting rather 
than family or friends in the gratuitous transfer setting, Part II of this Article 
is concluded by establishing that the functional or formal role of 
consideration supplies the best normative grounding for the requirement of 
consideration when that “stranger” relationship is paramount.  Conversely, 
in a setting involving promises or agreements between friends or family, the 
functional or formal requirement of consideration is inapt, unnecessary, and 
counterproductive thereby requiring a different set of functional 
requirements to validate gratuitous transfers (be they inter vivos or 
testamentary).14 
Part III supports the conclusion reached in Part II by continuing to 
compare contract-based transfers to gratuitous transfers that do not require 
 
10.  The development and use of the Seal in contracts is discussed infra notes 62-86 and 
accompanying text. 
11.  Id. 
12.  See infra notes 91-96 and text accompanying. 
13.  At the outset, it is noted that gratuitous transfers, which are enforceable by courts, must 
be differentiated from unenforceable gratuitous promises.  The two are often conflated but have 
quite different legal consequences.  See infra notes 113-114 and accompanying text. 
14.  See infra notes 143-194 and accompanying text.  Note that reputational sanction works 
in the gratuitous context because if the promise is not kept the putative donor’s friends and family 
are likely to be informed of the breach and the donor will lose reputational capital as a result.  In 
the business context, the offeree and offeror may not travel in the same circles and breach of one’s 
word will not result in the same loss of reputational capital.  In the first setting, informal or group 
sanctions may properly police inappropriate or immoral behavior.  In the second setting, court 
action may be necessary to address the same issue.  Hence, the need for consideration ex post.  
See, e.g., Albert H. Choi, Non-Profit Status and Relational Sanctions: Commitment to Quality 
through Repeat Interactions and Organizational Choice, 58 J.L. & ECON. 969 (2015). 
         
2015] CONTRACTS AND CONSIDERATION 553 
consideration.  In order to be validated, this Article establishes that these 
transfers have to satisfy similar functional formal requirements.  Hence, this 
Article establishes a typology of transfers that highlights the legal 
requirements for three types of distinct transfers of property or assets: 1) 
contracts or agreements supported or proven by consideration; 2) inter 
vivos gifts;15 and 3) testamentary transfers.16  These three distinct transfers 
are regarded by academics and lawyers as so legally separable and different, 
that they are taught in the normal law school curriculum in three different 
courses: Contracts (consideration and non-consideration based promises or 
agreements), Property (inter vivos gifts), and Trusts and Estates 
(testamentary transfers). 
The different legal requirements necessary to validate each transfer, 
however, mask a similar functional role embedded in each transaction.  
Furthermore, although the explication of the functional role of 
consideration as the normative base for the doctrine is not new and has been 
well-described in the scholarly literature.  That literature, to date, has 
focused only on the functional role played by consideration at the time of 
contracting (which this Article characterizes as “ex ante”).  Instead, in Part 
IV, this Article demonstrates that the functional basis for consideration 
serves a more important dyadic role.  In addition to its ex ante functional 
role, consideration also provides a different functional role at a time that 
this Article characterizes as ex post—that is, at the time of adjudication 
when the contract has allegedly been breached and a remedy is sought for 
its enforceability.  Having provided the legal glue that allows a court to 
later adjudicate the existence of an enforceable contract, consideration later 
provides the remedial basis to effectively enforce the contract. 
This ex post role of consideration reveals another function or purpose 
served by consideration that has previously gone undertheorized and 
unnoticed: the role that consideration plays at the end of the contract.  
Therefore, this Article concludes Part IV by demonstrating that, like 
constitutional rights, contract rights only exist if there is an effective 
 
15.  Although there are two types of valid gift transfers, those inter vivos and those that are 
causa mortis—made in contemplation of impending death—the distinction between the two is 
largely disappearing and for the purposes of my thesis herein makes little if any difference.  
Therefore, this article instead focuses on the more common and prevalent typical inter vivos gift 
and ignore for the sake of my argument gifts causa mortis. 
16.  Testamentary transfers are those that take place pursuant to a validly executed Will (this 
Article will capitalize the noun “Will” throughout to avoid any confusion with the verb “will”) 
and although these transfers relate back to the instant of the testator’s death (under the relation-
back doctrine), the actual or physical transfer is accomplished through the probate process 
pursuant to which the Will is validated and the testator’s assets are distributed pursuant to the 
Will.  Testamentary transfers are discussed below.  See infra notes 186-195 and accompanying 
text. 
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remedy to validate that right.  By comparing and contrasting contract-based 
transfers with their non-consideration counterparts (gifts and testamentary 
transfers), this Article elucidates the role played by consideration in 
providing that remedial basis—its ex post function.  Indeed, given that 
courts strive to ensure that their decisions are made correctly and 
efficiently, the formalities associated with each such transfer are designed 
to achieve those twin goals.17  Consequently, contracts validated by a 
finding of consideration, inter vivos gifts largely validated by the delivery 
requirement,18 and testamentary transfers validated by Wills Act 
formalities)19 are unified in that each supplies the courts with agreements 
that can be enforced with low error and adjudicative costs.20 
Absent from the analysis in Parts II, III, and IV, are agreements 
between individuals that are not deemed to be gratuitous promises and lack 
consideration but are nevertheless deemed enforceable.  This refers to those 
promises which induce reliance on the part of the promisee and are deemed 
enforceable pursuant to Section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts.21  These promises are addressed to buttress this Article’s central 
claim that the formalities associated with the three other transfers not only 
serve a functional role ex ante, but they also serve a remedial role ex post, 
as well.  A fuller exploration of enforceable gratuitous promises per the 
rationale of Section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts is 
addressed in a companion article that focuses solely on these transfers.22  
The companion article contends that early contract cases like Hamer v. 
Sidway,23 which were deemed supported by consideration, were not 
contract cases, but instead were inter vivos gift cases that were not 
completed due to changed conditions.24 
 
17.  See infra notes 179-185 and accompanying text. 
18.  See infra note 142 and accompanying text for discussion of the legal requirements for a 
valid gift. 
19.  See infra notes 152-160 and accompanying text. 
20.  See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307 (1994); see infra notes 179-182 and accompanying text. 
21.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) states in part: 
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or 
forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such 
action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the 
promise.  The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires. 
22.  Alex M. Johnson, Jr., A Trichotomy of Reliance Promises: Implied Good Faith in 
Business Relationships, Uncompleted Gift Transfers, and Public Policy Cases—Historical 
Development and Normative Explanation (2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW). 
23.  27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891). 
24.  The companion article, supra note 22, makes the claim that enforceable reliance based 
promises are enforceable solely due to the fact that the action of reliance establishes the remedial 
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As a result, Part V concludes by comparing valid and enforceable non-
consideration transfers (gifts and testamentary bequests hereafter 
collectively sometimes referred to as “donative transfers”) with valid and 
enforceable non-consideration transfers that do not satisfy those same 
certain functional requirements (reliance-based transfers enforced by use of 
the promissory estoppel doctrine).  These three types of distinct transfers in 
three different areas of the law have but one thing in common: they lack 
consideration.  This Article contends that even though these gifts, 
testamentary and reliance-based transactions are not supported by 
consideration in its classical form, i.e., the bargain theory of consideration, 
the functional formalities required for each allows the court to supply a 
remedy consistent with two related requirements: low administrative costs 
and minimized error costs associated with adjudication.  This is why 
“completed gifts,”25 testamentary transfers, and reliance-based promises 
unsupported by consideration are deemed enforceable and validated 
judicially. 
II.  THE SEARCH FOR A NORMATIVE BASE FOR 
CONSIDERATION: FOUR THEORIES DOMINATE 
Any search for a normative basis for consideration must begin with 
Lon Fuller’s classic article, Consideration and Form.26  In that article, 
Professor Fuller convincingly demonstrates that the role of consideration in 
contractual agreements is both formal and functional.27  Indeed, Professor 
Fuller’s primary hypothesis is that consideration has both formal and 
substantive components and he sets as his task disentangling the two.28  
 
evidence necessary to create an enforceable promise.  Id.  That evidence allows the court to 
dispense with the requirement of any formality attendant to enforceable promises.  Id.  Certain 
cases, however, mischaracterized as reliance cases should be properly characterized as gift 
transfers in which the requisite formalities are not complied with due to a change in conditions 
affecting the putative donor.  Id.  These cases developed at a time when contract law was 
immature and the doctrine of promissory estoppel was unavailable to courts as a category to 
capture cases in which the putative donee exhibited reliance behavior.  Id.  Hence, in many of 
these cases the courts incorrectly (for the right reasons) held that consideration was present in the 
transaction.  Id. 
25.  As discussed infra, see notes 130-135 and accompanying text, uncompleted gifts are 
deemed gratuitous promises and deemed unenforceable.  A completed gift because it is completed, 
i.e., the gift is delivered and accepted by the donee and the transfer is accompanied with donative 
intent, supplies the evidentiary basis for validating the gift, and insures that improvident transfers 
do not take place.  Completed gifts should be contrasted with uncompleted gifts in which the 
ritualistic, corroborative and evidentiary functions are not complied with and the gift is deemed 
unenforceable. 
26.  Fuller, supra note 4. 
27.  Id. at 799. 
28.  Id. at 800. 
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Consideration, he contends, performs primarily three functions: evidentiary, 
cautionary, and channeling.29  These three definitive functions are well 
known to contract scholars (and, as later examined, property and trust and 
estate scholars)30 and do not require much explication.  Briefly, 
consideration satisfies the evidentiary function by producing tangible and 
verifiable evidence that an enforceable agreement has been reached by and 
between the parties.31  The cautionary function brings home to those parties 
that they are entering into a transaction that can later be enforced against 
them.32  Hence, consideration “serves a check against inconsiderate 
action.”33  The channeling function is served by creating a process that 
creates an enforceable agreement if the requirement of consideration is 
met.34  A function closely related to channeling, but sometimes set out 
separately, is the so-called “ritualistic” function.  This function validates an 
agreement when parties to an agreement comply with a certain previously 
prescribed ritual.35  Again, to the parties performing the ritual, this brings 
home the notion that they are indeed making an enforceable promise.  
These functions are alleged to be interlocking and complementary.36 
The second normative base alleged for consideration is that theorized 
by the realists.37  In short, realists believe that consideration is simply a 
tautological device used by the courts to determine which contracts should 
be enforced.38  Professor Patrick Atiyah is a leading proponent of the realist 
approach.  Professor Atiyah contends that “consideration” simply means 
that there is a valid societal reason to enforce the contract,39 like good faith, 
duress, reliance,40 or the enforcement of a moral obligation.41  Given the 
 
29.  Id. at 800-01. 
30.  These same three functions are required with respect to validate gift or donative 
transfers, see infra notes 165-172 and accompanying text, and what are characterized as “Wills 
Act” formalities that are necessary to validate properly attested Wills.  See infra notes 173-178 
and accompanying text. 
31.  See infra notes 196-198 and accompanying text. 
32.  See infra note 195 and accompanying text. 
33.  Fuller, supra note 4, at 800. 
34.  Id.  “It [the formality of consideration] serves also to mark or signalize the enforceable 
promise; it furnishes a simple and external test of enforceability.  This function of form Ihering 
described as the ‘facilitation of judicial diagnosis’ . . . .” Id. 
35.  See infra note 127 and accompanying text. 
36.  See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 150 (9th ed. 
2013). 
37.  P. S. ATIYAH, Consideration: A Restatement in ESSAYS ON CONTRACT 179, 181 (Oxford 
Univ. Press, 1990). 
38.  Id. 
39.  See generally P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979). 
40.  Although this Article does not address good faith and duress, reliance is addressed infra 
notes 233-274 and accompanying text. 
         
2015] CONTRACTS AND CONSIDERATION 557 
realist account, it makes sense that the doctrine of consideration is 
tautological42 because it means that courts manipulate the rule or doctrine to 
find consideration when there are good reasons to enforce the agreement, 
yet find no consideration in similar situations when there are exogenous 
reasons not to enforce the agreement. 
The third normative base alleged for consideration is one premised on 
the contract as a promise, which focuses on the moral obligation of the 
promisor to do as promised.  The leading proponent of this theory is 
Professor Charles Fried who details the basis for this normative claim in his 
classic work, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATION.43  According to Professor Fried, individuals have autonomy 
to impose upon themselves obligations by making promises.  These 
promises morally obligate the individual to perform based on theories of 
individual autonomy and trust.44  Professor Fried produces an elegant 
theory in which only certain promises, knowing and fair promises, for 
example, should be enforced.  He dismisses the doctrine of consideration as 
a requirement for enforceable contracts because it is alleged to be too 
indeterminate.45  Instead, he argues for the development of an alternative 
theory that focuses on which promises should be enforceable based on their 
fairness.46 
A related normative justification has been characterized as 
“teleological.”  As portrayed elsewhere,47 Professor James Gordley is the 
leading proponent of the theory that contract law enforces agreements to 
 
41.  The issue adjudicated in Hamer, 27 N.E. at 257 (uncle promises to pay nephew $5000 
when nephew reaches the age of twenty-one, if nephew refrains from drinking alcohol, swearing 
and certain forms of gambling), raises this type of moral obligation.  These alleged moral 
obligation cases, I argue, are not moral obligation cases but cases of changed conditions.  They are 
addressed in my companion article.  See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
42.  See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
43.  CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 
(1981), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/about/privatelaw/contract.as.promise.1.56.fried.pdf. 
44.  Id. at 16. 
An individual is morally bound to keep his promises because he has intentionally 
invoked a convention whose function it is to give grounds—moral grounds—for 
another to expect the promised performance.  To renege is to abuse a confidence he 
was free to invite or not, and which he intentionally did invite.  To abuse that 
confidence now is like (but only like) lying: the abuse of a shared social institution that 
is intended to invoke the bonds of trust. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
45.  Id. at 38; “My conclusion is rather that the doctrine of consideration offers no coherent 
alternative basis for the force of contracts, while still treating promise as necessary to it.”  Id. 
46.  Id. at 39. 
47.  See Zhouyan Xie, Towards a Normative Basis of the Doctrine of Consideration, 
(unpublished Master’s Thesis, University of Toronto), https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/ 
bitstream/1807/25523/5/Zhuoyan_Xie_201011_LLM_thesis.pdf. 
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achieve the substantive end of the “good life” in the Aristotelian tradition.48  
Pursuant to this theory, cumulative and distributive justice demands that 
most fair promises be enforced but certain promises, gratuitous promises 
made in haste, for example, should not be enforced because the promises do 
not promote the good life.  Thus, the law should not respect the latter type 
of promises. 
Certain law and economic theorists, such as Professors Robert Cooter 
and Thomas Ulen, criticize the doctrine of consideration encapsulated 
within the “bargain theory” of contracts.  Both professors believe the 
doctrine does not capture and enforce certain promises that both the 
promisor and promisee want enforced¾the enforcement of which makes 
both parties better off¾a pareto efficient or superior49 state of affairs.50  
Instead, they argue that a contract should be enforceable when both the 
promisor and promisee intend it to be enforceable.51  This is alleged to be 
more efficient and optimally societally productive.52 
Consequently, even though the vast majority of courts continue to 
follow the view that consideration is produced via this process in which 
promises are bargained for and exchanged, modern contract theory has 
moved beyond this rather simplistic, circular, and tautological test53 to 
advance the view that contracts should be enforceable if that is the parties’ 
 
48.  See JAMES GORDLEY, Contract Law in the Aristotelian Tradition, in THE THEORY OF 
CONTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS 265, 265-334 (Peter Benson ed., 2011). 
49.  See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 16-17 (4th ed. 2003). 
50.  They prove their thesis by detailing a hypothetical in which a shopping automobile 
buyer is given an offer by a seller/dealer and the seller/dealer wants to induce the buyer to 
carefully consider the offer as she visits other dealerships by making it a firm and irrevocable 
offer that can be accepted at the option of the buyer.  See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 49, at 194 
51.  “In general, economic efficiency requires enforcing a promise if the promisor and 
promisee both wanted enforceability when it was made . . . Both parties want a promise to be 
enforceable so that the promisor can credibly commit to performing.  A credible commitment to 
performing enables the parties to cooperate, and cooperation is efficient.”  Id. at 195, 199.  This 
theory has found purchase in the UCC’s firm offer rule that validates firm offers made by 
merchants for a reasonable period of time.  U.C.C. § 2-205 (AM. LAW. INST. & UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 1977).  The problem with the theory is that there is no way to differentiate contracts 
which should be enforced from gratuitous or gift promises which both parties want enforced at the 
time they are made and which are deemed unenforceable.  Although they do not address this issue, 
perhaps they intend such gratuitous promises to be enforceable.  On the contrary, these promises 
per se should remain unenforceable unless certain formalities (functions) are complied with, i.e., 
delivery and acceptance because these formalities prevent improvident transfers.  See infra notes 
168-172 and accompanying text for further discussion of this issue. 
52.  See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 49, at 194-95. 
53.  The test is circular because a benefit is conferred or a detriment incurred only if the court 
later determines that the agreement is enforceable.  The benefit or detriment test does not identify 
which promises are enforceable, it only identifies that once a promise is deemed enforceable a 
benefit is conferred and a detriment incurred. 
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intention.54  The weakness of this approach is determining, of course, 
whether or when the parties truly intend that they be enforceable.55  A full 
endorsement of this latter theory produces the result that any promise, 
including perhaps a gratuitous uncompleted promise,56 becomes 
enforceable as long as the parties’ intent is sufficiently proven. 
These four normative theories are not in conflict and, to a large degree, 
are not inconsistent.  Indeed, one can make the argument that they are also, 
to a large extent, complementary.  In other words, it is fair to state that to 
some extent, consideration is in the eye of the beholder.  A promise made in 
writing to pay $500 for a watch that is accepted by the promisee in a 
separate writing may be justified on the basis of all four theories (five if 
teleological is counted as one of the distinct normative theories).  Similarly, 
a gratuitous promise by a father, at his daughter’s sweet sixteen party, to 
purchase his daughter a Rolls Royce automobile if she makes the honor roll 
during her senior year, is not enforceable using these same normative 
theories (although one can make a stronger argument that the promise 
should be enforced if the father has the means to enforce it under the moral 
normative theory).57 
The goal herein is not to prove that certain normative theories are 
wrongheaded, nor is it to provide a comparative analysis of the four or five 
normative theories addressed above.  The goal is to assess and describe the 
best normative theory to support the doctrine and use of consideration in 
contract law when it is acknowledged that consideration is not required for 
other enforceable agreements, such as gifts or testamentary transfers.  In 
 
54. We want to replace the bargain theory with a less dogmatic, more responsive 
theory of contracts.  In the two preceding examples, enforceability of the contract 
apparently makes two people better off, as measured by their own desires, without 
making anyone worse off.  Whenever a change in the law makes someone better off 
without making anyone worse off, “Pareto efficiency” requires changing the law. . . In 
general, economic efficiency requires enforcing a promise if the promisor and 
promisee both wanted enforceability when it was made. 
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 49, at 195. 
55.  In the rare case when both parties testify or plead that they intended to be bound, there 
will be no dispute regarding the existence of consideration pursuant to this test.  However, in this 
rare case, there should be no litigation since both parties “agree” on their respective intents.  In the 
more likely real-world case when one party is seeking to enforce the agreement while the other 
party is seeking to avoid enforcement of the agreement, it is very unlikely that the party seeking to 
avoid the agreement will testify that the specific intent was to be bound ex ante.  When the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts establishes exceptions to its consideration rule in this 
context—when the parties’ express intent is to be bound—it does so in very formalized or stylized 
transactions in which the channeling, corroborative, and evidentiary functions of the transaction 
are proven as part of the transaction.  See infra notes 168-180 and accompanying text. 
56.  A gratuitous promise that is performed is a completed gift and legally enforceable as 
such.  See infra notes 162-168 for a discussion of the requirements necessary for a valid and 
enforceable gift transfer. 
57.  See supra notes 45-48. 
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other words, when employing a comparative approach that examines 
transactions beyond contracts, is there a normative theory that can explain 
promises that are legally enforceable in contract law as well as inter vivos 
gifts and testamentary transfers that are also legally enforceable?  Given 
that approach and the fact the test used to determine whether there is 
consideration has not remained static over time, this Article concludes that 
the best theoretical normative basis for consideration is indeed the 
functional or formal basis for consideration fully addressed by Professor 
Fuller. 
But this will be discussed more in detail later.  How we arrived at this 
confused state of affairs, with certain promises deemed enforceable and 
others not is the product largely of history.58  But this history is informative 
because contract law and the requirement of consideration start with form 
and formalism,59 eradicate the same, and then embark upon a search for a 
substitute of the formalism that eventuates in a construct of consideration 
which replicates the purpose and substance of the eradicated formalism.60  
Moreover, the ancient form and formalism that was the key to the initial 
concept of consideration holds the answer to the question of why 
unperformed gratuitous promises are unenforceable and completed 
gratuitous promises and certain testamentary transfers are enforced, and 
rightly so.61 
At one time, consideration was not required to find an enforceable 
agreement.62  Instead, when contract law was evolving and modernizing 
under English common law, “Contracts under Seal” were enforced by the 
courts.63  Indeed, here the history of contract law is somewhat illuminating 
and instructive for this thesis.  At the dawn of the Industrial Revolution in 
England, contracts were enforceable when they were accompanied by the 
promisor’s Seal.64  The use of a Seal, which predated the formal 
requirement of consideration, made the promisor’s promise enforceable in 
 
58.  Here, for the sake of argument, this Article ignores reliance-based acts taken by the 
promisee that causes these promises to be deemed enforceable per Section 90 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts.  For a discussion of these interesting cases, see infra notes 251-273 and 
accompanying text. 
59.  See infra notes 76-80 and accompanying text. 
60.  See infra notes 86-96 and accompanying text. 
61.  Id. 
62.  See infra notes 76-80 and accompanying text. 
63.  JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 7 (6th ed. 2009). 
64.  See Frederick E. Crane, The Magic of the Private Seal, 15 COLUM. L. REV. 24, 24 
(1915); What is a Seal? “For some period in history [S]eals were required to consist of wax 
affixed to parchment or paper on which the terms of the instrument were written.  The wax was 
required to have an identifiable impression made upon it.  Usually this was made by a signet ring.”  
PERILLO, supra note 63, § 7.3 (citation omitted). 
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courts of law.65  In brief, a promisor would affix his66 Seal—a blob of 
melted wax—which was impressed upon the document or contract and 
delivered to the promisee.67 
A contract under Seal was deemed to be a valid and enforceable 
contract if three required formalities were met: a writing was executed, 
affixed with a Seal, and the sealed instrument was delivered to the promisee 
or the promisee’s agent.68  There was also a fourth requirement that cannot 
be characterized as a formality: the party executing the sealed instrument 
must intend it to be a sealed instrument.69  Although this was the law and 
the state of affairs centuries ago, it is addressed herein not only as the 
precursor to consideration but because of the functional role that the Seal 
provided: 
By the late Middle Ages, English Law had developed the Seal, a 
highly serviceable, all-purpose formality.  It was used to 
authenticate transfers of ownership, especially transfers of interest 
in land by way of “deed,” and also to make promises 
enforceable . . . Viewed in light of Professor Fuller’s description of 
the [evidentiary, cautionary and channeling] functions that legal 
formalities can perform, the Seal in its heyday deserved a high 
rating . . . A ceremony with all of these elements (affixing a Seal 
and delivering the sealed instrument) was surely calculated—
definitely calculated, it seems, by those who conceived it—to 
produce persuasive evidence, to make a sharp impression on the 
participants, and to provide visible signs of authenticity. 70 
If the prescribed formalities were followed, nothing more was needed 
to make enforceable a promise “under Seal.”71 
 
65.  Id. 
66.  Back then, promisors were mostly all males given that females had not yet attained the 
freedom to contract except in unusual circumstances.  See Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of 
Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives’ Rights to Earning, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L. J. 2127, 2127 
(1994). 
67.  Note that delivery was part of this process.  See A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE 
COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 90 (1987). 
68.  PERILLO, supra note 63, § 7.1. 
69.  Id. § 7.3.  The fact that intent and delivery were required for a contract under Seal, 
which mimics the requirements of donative intent and delivery for an effective inter vivos gift 
should not go unnoticed and is addressed in greater detail.  See infra notes 160-172 and 
accompanying text. Indeed, the third requirement for a valid inter vivos gift—acceptance by the 
done—has a similar counterpart in contracts under Seal —acceptance by the promisee.  Id. § 7.6. 
70.  JOHN P. DAWSON, WILLIAM BURNETT HARVEY, STANLEY D. HENDERSON & DOUGLAS 
G. BAIRD, CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENT 196 (10th ed. 2013) (referencing Fuller, supra 
note 4). 
71.  Id. 
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Indeed, the contract under Seal was very effective in proving that a 
contract or agreement was enforceable.  In fact, the contract under Seal was 
said to be almost invulnerable to attack.  The party whose signature and 
Seal appeared on the document could only attack same by showing that it 
was either a forgery or if he72 had in fact signed and Sealed, that the 
document signed and sealed was misrepresented to him at the time of 
signing and sealing (no intent—the fourth requirement), thereby 
establishing fraud in factum.73  No other defense or claim could establish 
the invalidity of the sealed document, including a claim that the other 
party’s performance had not been received (i.e., failure of consideration).74  
If the promisor subsequently failed to perform the promise that was 
“Sealed,” the promisee could bring suit for breach of the promise by using 
the traditional common law writ of “covenant.”75 
The formalist Seal that preceded the requirement of consideration was 
no doubt influenced by several factors, including the ancient formalities 
associated with the transfer of land that required there be some livery of 
seisin to effectuate a valid transfer.76  The Seal was also used at a time 
when most individuals were illiterate and the execution or preparation of a 
written document was a rarity that denominated a special, important, and 
memorable occasion and not a casual promise.77 
As a result, the process by which the Seal was produced, the rarity it 
represented, and the solemnity of the process made it an effective way to 
ensure that a serious and genuine promise had been made, could be proven 
easily later (even if one of the parties to the agreement subsequently died), 
and guaranteed that the promisor carefully considered the validity of the 
promise before its making.78  That is to say, the Seal satisfied the 
evidentiary, cautionary, channeling, and ritualistic functions in the role of 
contracts.79  These important functions, which are discussed in greater 
detail,80 allowed the parties, and most importantly, the courts, to determine 
 
72.  Again, it was all “he’s” in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, because women lacked 
the capacity to contract.  See supra note 68 and accompanying text, addressing the impact of 
Married Woman Property Acts. 
73.  DAWSON, ET AL., supra note 70, at 196-97. 
74.  Id. 
75.  Id. § 1.03. 
76.  This predated delivery of title via written and executed deed.  See JESSE DUKEMINIER, 
JAMES KRIER, GREGORY ALEXANDER, MICHAEL SCHILL & LIOR STRAHILEVITZ, PROPERTY 243-
44 (8th ed. 2015). 
77.  FERRIELL, supra note 3, at 66-67. 
78.  See Fuller, supra note 4, at 800-01. 
79.  FERRIELL, supra note 3, § 3.02. 
80.  See infra notes 160-172 and accompanying text. 
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at almost no cost with little risk of error, which agreements or promises 
were enforceable. 
The demise of the application of the Seal, for good and valid reasons, 
should not obscure the purpose for which it served.81  The rise of the use of 
“consideration” as the vehicle by which contracts or promises are deemed 
enforceable if valid consideration is found, also should not obscure the 
functional role of the Seal and should lead to inquiry whether that 
functional role has been met via the requirement of consideration.  It is to 
the functional roles served initially by “Sealing” that this Article now turns 
with a focus on why agreements unsupported by consideration, either inter 
vivos (via gift) or testamentary (via Will) are deemed valid.  The key to the 
validity and use of consideration in contract law can only be ascertained by 
examining those valid agreements or transfers that are made without 
consideration. 
More importantly, consideration in modern contracts serves the same 
purposive role that the Seal served in contracts under Seal in England in the 
Middle Ages and today in jurisdiction that still validate the use of the Seal.  
To find an enforceable agreement, consideration is required, by the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the courts, because it supplies the 
evidentiary, cautionary, channeling, and ritualistic functions at the time of 
contracting and evidence of the agreement82 ex post at the time of 
adjudication.83 
At this juncture, it is important to note that the contract under Seal, 
because of the formalities attendant at the time of execution (ex ante) and 
the information conveyed at the time of adjudication (ex post), that is, 
intent, delivery and acceptance, provided the adjudicative entity with 
extremely reliable, almost irrefutable, evidence of the agreement and its 
terms.  This allowed the adjudicative entity to enforce the agreement with 
little, if any, error costs and to do so via the review of one document, 
 
81.  As explained by FERRIELL, supra note 3, § 3.02(A), the demise of the Seal was due to 
several factors, but was primarily due to the fact that it was too restrictive given the growth of 
commercial industry and the need for a less formalistic and ritualistic manner of making 
enforceable promises.  In addition, the formalism associated with the Seal eventually gave way to 
very informal methods of “Sealing”—i.e., one could Seal by placing the initial L.S. on a 
document.  See Pitts v. Pitchford, 201 So. 2d 563, 564 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 96 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981).  Sealing no 
longer satisfied the cautionary, evidentiary, channeling, and ritualistic functional requirements that 
would later allow a court to easily determine which agreements should be deemed enforceable and 
which not with little if any error costs.  Id. 
82.  Including establishing the remedial boundaries for enforcement of the right established 
by the contract. 
83.  This is assuming there is a dispute over either the enforceability or validity of the 
agreement or the performance of the terms of the agreement.  See infra notes 110-111 and 
accompanying text. 
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producing low administrative costs.  Although the reasons for the demise of 
the Seal are many and beyond the purview of this Article,84 no one claims 
or has demonstrated that the Seal raised difficult issues of interpretation or 
enforceability.  To the contrary, the contract under Seal represented a very 
effective and efficient vehicle for a party to signal that he was entering into 
an enforceable agreement that should be enforced against the sealing party 
notwithstanding any subsequent objection. 
Moreover, it is illuminating to note that the doctrine of consideration 
was in use as a vehicle to regulate and control informal (unsealed) promises 
during the time of the Seal’s prominence and use in the Middle Ages.85  
Thus, consideration originated as a doctrine to serve the same function as 
the Seal when individuals either lacked a Seal or the transaction was not 
important enough to use a Seal.  What is key for this thesis is the 
substitutionary role played by the doctrine of consideration at its 
origination, which if used as a substitute for a Seal, should suffice to serve 
the same role and function. 
Of course, after the demise of the Seal, only contracts supported by 
consideration were enforceable by the courts86 and the initial conception of 
consideration that covered only informal agreements expanded and evolved 
to cover all contracts.87  The first formulation of “consideration” that 
appears in the Restatement (First) of Contracts defines consideration as 
follows: “Consideration for a promise is an act other than a promise, or a 
forbearance, or the creation, modification, or destruction of a legal relation, 
or a return promise, bargained for and given in exchange for the promise.”88 
Given the prominence and relevance of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts and its requirement and definition of consideration, little is gained 
by exploring and explicating the requirement and definition of 
consideration in the Restatement (First) of Contracts except to note two 
 
84.  For a discussion of what caused the demise of the Seal, see Crane, supra note 64. 
However, the Seal does remain valid in a few jurisdictions: Delaware and Wisconsin. See 
PERRILLO, supra note 63, § 7.9.  A contract under Seal is also recognized by the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 95-96 (AM. LAW INST. 
1981).  My views on the demise of the Seal and support for the expanded use of the Seal in 
contemporaneous transactions are addressed in Johnson, A Trichotomy of Reliance Promises, 
supra note 22. 
85.  DAWSON, ET. AL., supra note 70, at 196. 
86.  Enforceable in this context simply means that the mechanisms of the State, i.e., the 
courts can be successfully employed to enforce the agreement or determine and enforce an 
appropriate remedy if the contract is breached by one of the parties. 
87.  See FERRIELL, supra note 3, § 3.02, at 66-68.  Agreements that are deemed enforceable 
due to the doctrine of promissory estoppel are discussed infra notes 234-273 and accompanying 
text. 
88.  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 75 (AM. LAW INST. 1933). 
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important points.  First, although the definition of consideration evolved 
and morphed into the requirement of either an act of forbearance,89 an 
impact on a legal relation, or a return promise by the promisee, one should 
not lose sight of the fact that consideration served as a substitute for the 
Seal in informal contracts.  As such, the purpose of consideration should be 
similar to the purpose served by the role of the Seal in sealed contracts.  
Furthermore, if the primary purpose of the Seal was to provide verifiable, 
irrefutable evidence of an enforceable agreement that could be validated ex 
post at little or no cost, consideration should serve a similar purpose, a topic 
discussed shortly.90 
Second, and not as importantly, Section 75 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts contains within its definition of consideration the 
first and very prominent reference to a bargain between the promisor and 
the promisee.91  Pursuant to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, courts 
began enforcing agreements or promises as long as the promises exchanged 
by and between the parties were “bargained for.”92  Or, to be more precise, 
consideration which was once viewed as an exchange of things¾the items, 
goods, etc. that passed between the parties93¾that caused the promise to be 
enforceable, literally became a process rather than a thing.  This process 
that creates an enforceable contract between two or more distinct parties 
occurs when the parties make promises (bilateral94 as opposed to 
unilateral)95 and each intends that the promise be given or received in 
exchange for the other’s promise.96 
 
89.  Forbearance is a difficult concept to grasp in brief, but it is sufficient to note at this point 
that if forbearance is found that is sufficient consideration to establish an enforceable contract. 
90.  For further discussion of this issue, see infra notes 221-232 and accompanying text. 
91.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 75 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
92.  FRIER & WHITE, supra note 3, at 36. 
93.  In law school hypotheticals, these things were always a peppercorn in exchange for 
something else. 
94. A bilateral contract is formed when both parties have made promises.  Consequently, 
each party to the agreement is both a promisor and a promisee.  A party is a promisor with respect 
to the promise she has made to the other and simultaneously a promisee with respect to the 
promise received from the other party.  See PERRILLO, supra note 63. 
95.  Unilateral contracts by comparison are contracts where only one party acts as promisor 
and invites performance by the other party but does not require a reciprocal promise in exchange, 
as part of the bargain.  Unilateral promises become enforceable contracts when the promisee 
begins performance per the terms of the offer.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 50 
(AM. LAW INST. 1981).  The prototypical unilateral promise is when one offers a reward for return 
of a lost pet. 
96.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (AM. LAW INST. 1981): Requirement of 
Exchange; Types of Exchange states: 
(1) To constitute consideration, a performance or a return promise must be bargained 
for. 
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Although not explicitly stated in the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, most courts operationalize that treatise’s definition of 
consideration by employing what is commonly called the “benefit-detriment 
test” to determine whether a bargained-for promise is supported by 
consideration.97  In other words, the promisee must suffer some legal 
detriment¾to do, or promise to do, something that the promisee was not 
legally obligated to do before the promise was received.  Concomitantly 
(and the mirror image), the promisor obtains a legal benefit that he or she 
did not have before the bargain was struck.  This benefit-detriment test, or 
requirement in bargained-for exchanges, represents the view of 
consideration currently in vogue in the majority of courts which is prevalent 
in the definition of consideration in the Restatement (First) of Contracts 
with its focus, in part, on an act, or forbearance of an act, or the creation, 
modification, or destruction of a legal relation.98  Indeed, one can credibly 
argue that the definition of consideration in the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts represents an evolution of the definition of consideration in the 
Restatement (First) of Contracts with a greater emphasis, however, on the 
bargaining process that creates the promises or forbearance that 
subsequently affects the parties’ legal relationship.99 
To summarize, the initial role provided by consideration was purely 
formal and quite functional in the guise and use of a Seal.  For whatever 
reason, the use of the Seal waned but the need for some method to validate 
enforceable agreements from those not still remained.  Enter the doctrine of 
consideration that was the informal stepchild of the Seal when the Seal 
 
(2) A performance or return promise is bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in 
exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for that promise. 
(3) The performance may consist of 
(a) an act other than a promise, or 
(b) a forbearance, or 
(c) the creation, modification, or destruction of a legal relation. 
(4) The performance or return promise may be given to the promisor or to some other 
person.  It may be given by the promisee or by some other person. 
97.  FRIER & WHITE, supra note 3, at 38.  The benefit-detriment test may, in part, be 
attributable to the requirement in the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 75 (AM. LAW INST. 
1933), that consideration is found when the promisee can show that he or she incurred either the 
“creation, modification, or destruction of a legal relation.”  Id. 
98.  Id. at 48. 
99.  The weakness of the benefit-detriment test is that almost any promise or act can be 
manipulated so that the promisee or promisor, as the case may be, can suffer a legal detriment or 
obtain a legal benefit.  For example, since a donee is not legally required to accept a gift, the 
donee’s acceptance of the gift can be construed as a legal benefit conferred on the donor thereby 
collapsing the distinction between gratuitous transfers and bargained-for exchanges when the 
benefit-detriment test is used to determine whether there is consideration.  For fuller discussion of 
this important point as it pertains to gratuitous transfers, see infra notes 160-168 and 
accompanying text. 
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reigned supreme.  The Seal was used for formal and important agreements 
while consideration was used for less formal agreements.  Hence, 
consideration was viewed as something lesser than the Seal.  Eventually the 
doctrine of consideration evolved into an almost tautological test100 that 
requires the identification of a bargain and the conferral of a benefit and/or 
the creation of a legal detriment.  This Article contends that the focus on the 
bargain, and relatedly, the benefit or detriment created thereby, has largely 
obscured the functional and formal role originally supplied by the Seal and 
now supplied by the doctrine of consideration.  This Article is not the first 
to note this phenomenon101 nor will it be the last to base a normative theory 
of consideration on the form and functions so provided.  Indeed, a healthy 
debate has emerged regarding the normative base for consideration that was 
previously addressed.102 
But that raises another mystery: however one grounds the normative 
base for consideration and regardless of the historical evolution of the 
doctrine of consideration, so-called gratuitous promises between parties in a 
preexisting relationship are not enforceable.103  Courts fixate on the lack of 
consideration to find “mere” donative promises gratuitous and 
unenforceable.104  Those who contend that contracts or agreements should 
be enforceable if the parties so intend come to the same conclusion, that so-
called gratuitous promises are unenforceable per se, albeit for different 
reasons.105 
 
100.  See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
101.  See Fuller, supra note 4. 
102.  See supra notes 28-57 and accompanying text. 
103.  The starting point is that donative promises are not generally enforced.  This is a 
tenable position.  In addition to difficulties of proof, the injury in this type of case is relatively 
slight; there are no significant costs on the part of the promisee and no enrichment on the part of 
the promisor at the expense of the promisee.  Furthermore, a donative promise may be made 
without sufficient deliberation and not a promise made with deliberation is unenforceable if the 
promisee subsequently shows ingratitude.  PERRILLO, supra note 63, § 4.1 (citations omitted); see 
also Melvin Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of Gift, 85 CAL. L. REV. 821, 842-
46 (1997); see also Richard Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J.L. STUDIES 
411, 414-15 (1977). 
104.  Lack of consideration means no item or thing is transferred under the common law 
formalistic view, no process pursuant to which bargained for promises are exchanged under the 
view adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 71 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
105.  In brief, there are three views why gratuitous promises should not be enforced: 1) 
societal resources should not be employed to enforce promises when no economic gain is created 
by the transfer or transaction (the prototypical sterile transaction of yore); 2) courts are not capable 
of enforcing promises made with, say, love or affection because there is no appropriate remedy in 
case of breach; and 3) somewhat counterfactually and gaining ground among academic theorists, 
certain promises are by their very nature only valuable and valid if they are not enforceable by the 
courts.  These three very different reasons are discussed infra in Part IV and notes accompanying. 
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Thus, what begins as a puzzle, ends in unanimity.  Whether you 
understand the need for consideration, whether you apply one requirement 
or another of the rule for consideration, and lastly, whether you focus on the 
parties’ intent in determining whether there is an enforceable agreement, 
there remains a whole class of promises that are unenforceable.  Promises 
can, therefore, be divided into those that are enforceable and hence, non-
gratuitous, and those promises that are not enforceable, i.e., those deemed 
gratuitous.  In this lexicon, the focus is on whether the unperformed 
promise is subsequently legally enforceable. 
On the other hand, an examination of transfers rather than promises, 
reveals that a certain type of gratuitous transfers based on donative 
promises are enforceable if certain formalities or functions are met.  But 
none of these formalities or functions are viewed or treated as 
consideration.  As previously discussed,106 to become enforceable a gift or 
donative transfer must satisfy three very distinct requirements.  First, the 
putative donor must have the requisite intent to make a gift.107  Second, the 
donor must transfer possession to satisfy the delivery requirement necessary 
to effectuate a gift.108  Third, and oft overlooked, the putative donee must 
accept the gift in order for it to be valid.109 
These three requirements are important for several distinct reasons.  
First, these three formal requirements also serve functional purposes similar 
to the requirement served by consideration.110  Again, the functional 
purposes are ritualistic, evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling.111  Second, 
gifts are enforced once these three requirements (intent, delivery, and 
acceptance) are met.  This means it is incorrect and inappropriate to state 
that all gratuitous transfers are not enforced, when only gratuitous promises 
that do not meet these three requirements are not enforced.  When these 
requirements are met, a completed and valid gift is found and the donee is 
awarded the property that is the subject of the gift.112 
Although this is a fine point and distinction, courts will not enforce 
uncompleted gift or gratuitous promises which are acts that do not satisfy 
 
106.  See supra note 7; see infra notes 160-168 and accompanying text. 
107.  These three requirements are discussed in DUKEMINIER, ET. AL., supra note 76, at 165. 
108.  Id. 
109.  Id. 
110.  See infra notes 160-68 and accompanying text. 
111.  See Phillip Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of Choses in 
Action Evidenced by Commercial Instruments, 22 ILL. L. REV. 341, 348-49 (1926).  These three 
requirements are addressed in greater detail infra notes 160-168 and accompanying text. 
112.  See Gruen v. Gruen, 496 N.E. 2d 869, 875 (N.Y. 1986) (donee awarded possession of 
Gustav Klimt in possession of stepmother when donee established delivery, intent, and acceptance 
of the painting as a twenty-first birthday present). 
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the three requirements of intent, delivery, and acceptance that are addressed 
above.  Therefore, a promise to give a gift in the future that is not carried 
out (lacking delivery) and/or accepted by the donee is unenforceable.  If, 
however, the subject of the promise is delivered (delivery does not have to 
mean present delivery of possession, it can mean present delivery of a 
future interest in which possession is postponed)113 and subsequently 
accepted by the donee, the transfer is just as enforceable as an agreement 
(contract) supported by bargained-for consideration.  In sum, this Article 
has examined three different types of exchanges or transaction: 1) contract-
based exchanges with consideration; 2) so-called gratuitous transfers that 
are enforced even given the absence of consideration;114 and 3) so-called 
gratuitous promises that are not supported by consideration and are largely 
unenforced. 
Testamentary transfers made pursuant to valid Wills are gift transfers 
that differ from completed inter vivos gifts because these revocable 
promises in Wills create future gifts if certain formalities are complied with 
at the time the promises (in the Will) are made and the promises made in 
the Will remain unrevoked prior to the death of the will maker.115  As 
previously discussed,116 these enforceable unperformed gratuitous promises 
are similar to contracts supported by consideration even though they 
admittedly lack consideration.  This testamentary donative transfer, 
however, is not an inter vivos or present transfer but a future transfer that 
violates the oft stated precept that unperformed gratuitous promises are 
mere nudum pactums117 and unenforceable.118  Wills and other testamentary 
bequests, however, are indeed enforceable if requisite formalities are met.  
In fact, most states have specialized courts, denominated Probate, Wills, or 
Chancery Courts that exist solely to enforce these promises.119  
Furthermore, like inter vivos gifts, recipients of testamentary gifts must 
 
113.  See id. 
114.  These gratuitous and enforceable transfers can be inter vivos, that is gift, or 
testamentary via Wills.  As to the latter, see infra notes 160-72 and accompanying text. 
115.  Wills are by definition revocable and cannot be made irrevocable thus providing the 
putative testator with an option, assuming the testator is competent, to revoke any gift made 
pursuant to an otherwise valid Will.  See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Is it Time for Irrevocable Wills?, 
53 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 393, 394 (2016). 
116.  See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
117.  A nudum pactum is defined as “[a] voluntary promise, without any other consideration 
than mere good will, or natural reflection.” Nudum pactum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 
1968). 
118.  See, e.g., Grimes v. Baker, 133 Neb. 517, 275 N.W. 860, 863 (1937). 
119.  DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 36, at 43. 
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confer a legal benefit of the testator’s estate by accepting the testamentary 
gift given the donee’s right to disclaim it.120 
The third and perhaps most important point then is when comparing so-
called valid gift or donative transfers and bargained-for contracts supported 
by consideration, the benefit-detriment test is employed to validate the latter 
transactions.  If the benefit-detriment test is taken seriously, there is no 
distinction between a gratuitous transfer of inter vivos gifts and a contract 
supported by bargained-for consideration.  Because donees are required to 
accept a gift in order to make it legally valid,121 the agreement bestows 
upon the donor a benefit and the donee incurs a legal detriment.122  At that 
point, the donee is the owner of the property with all of the attendant rights 
and responsibilities that accrue to the ownership of property.  What this 
means is that completed inter vivos donative transfers ─  gifts ─  can be 
validated as contracts if consideration and the benefit-detriment test are 
taken seriously and employed.123 
Once again, there is no legal distinction between gift or gratuitous 
transfers and bargained-for or contract-based transfers when each is 
examined and validated by employing the benefit-detriment test.124  Here, 
both types of transfers are technically supported by consideration thus 
blurring the distinction between gifts and contracts (bargained-for 
exchanges that are deemed non-gratuitous) and requiring them to be treated 
similarly by the courts.  Why then are gift and testamentary transfers 
treated differently than bargained for transfers supported by consideration 
because consideration is broadly defined?  Why are donative transfers 
covered in property law and testamentary transfers treated in probate law 
 
120.  UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-1105 (amended 2010). 
121.  The requirement of donee acceptance seems superfluous because who rejects a gift?  
However, acceptance plays a vital role in these transactions because if a donee was not required to 
accept a gift, donors could transfer burdensome property to donees and rid themselves of harmful 
or costly obligations such as transferring real property that is polluted.  Of course, if donees were 
required to accept all gifts, our donee in this example could simply retransfer the gift back to the 
original donor thereby creating a perpetual gift cycle. 
122.  In most cases, the “detriment” incurred by the donee is beneficial.  For example, in 
Gruen, the donee received a very valuable painting that he later sold for several million dollars.  
496 N.E.2d at 875.  That is hard to qualify as a detriment.  However, detriment in this context 
refers to legal detriment, not financial detriment so that even if the right ceded in the transfer by 
the donee (here the legal right not to accept the painting) that bestows a benefit on the promisor 
results in financial gain or benefit to the donee, legal detriment has occurred.  This is made crystal 
clear in the discussion of Hamer, 27 N.E at 257. 
123.  Likewise, testamentary transfers require acceptance on the part of heirs and 
beneficiaries.  Under the Uniform Probate Code, these individuals have the right to disclaim any 
bequest bestowed upon them either through intestacy (no Will) or via Will.  UNIF. PROBATE CODE 
§2-1105 (amended 2010).  Beneficiaries often disclaim their interest to redirect the gift elsewhere 
and to avoid tax liability.  DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 36, at 141-42. 
124.  See supra notes 121-23 and text accompanying. 
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(trusts and estates) instead of contract law if valid gift and testamentary 
transfers are supported by consideration?  The answer to these questions 
and the reason why these transfers are conceptually and legally distinct is 
due to the different formalities necessary to validate each such transfer. 
Those formalities are necessary and divergent because of the context 
within which the transactions arise.  These disparate contexts are key to 
illuminating normative bases and establishing the formal and functional role 
of consideration in non-gratuitous transfers (contracts).  These formalities 
not only suffice to establish the existence and validity of the transfer, but 
they also provide proof of the transfer and supply the adjudicator with the 
basis for providing an effective remedy. 
Consequently, what was previously ignored in academic literature 
discussing the distinction between contracts and gratuitous transfers was the 
common element of functional formalities that is shared by both 
transactions.  What has been overlooked are the different contexts within 
which these transfers occur.  Gratuitous transfers are different from 
contracts not because they lack consideration (they are indeed supported by 
the broad and tautological definition of consideration); gratuitous transfers, 
however, differ from contracts in the context in which they are given when 
compared to so-called bargained-for contracts.  If a dispute were to arise 
regarding a contract’s enforceability or the meaning of its terms, the 
different contexts require different formalities that subsequently provide 
courts with adjudicative evidence at low error and administrative costs. 
The same can be said for testamentary donative transfers.  In regard to 
these testamentary “transactions,” the functions are designed to provide 
courts with evidence that can be adduced and enforced following the death 
of the donor with low cost and little attendant error.125  The valid execution 
of a written document designated as the testator’s Will,126 that requires 
acknowledgment of the document as her Will in the presence of the two 
witness and that may require the testator to sign the Will in the presence of 
the two witnesses, is clearly designed to satisfy the evidentiary function as 
well as the cautionary, channeling, and ritualistic functions similar to the 
use of the Seal and later consideration.127  Hence, contracts, inter vivos 
 
125.  Testamentary transfers are addressed infra Part IV. 
126.  Designating the document a Will with an initial capital “W,” is a means to clearly 
delineate a validly executed testamentary document known as a Will from the noun will meaning 
the power of control that the mind has over its own actions. 
127.  The attestation requirements for execution of a non-holographic Will can be found in 
the Uniform Probate Code.  See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-501 & 5-502 (amended 2010).  It is 
interesting and informative to note that in Section 2-503, a Will that does not strictly comply with 
the formalities of attestation can nevertheless be probated as the product of “harmless error” if the 
proponent of the Will can establish “by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended 
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gifts, and testamentary transfers have one element in common: they require 
formalities that provide courts with evidence that can be adduced later at 
low error and adjudicative cost. 
Similarly, the context within which these two types of gratuitous 
transfers occur is very important and has often been overlooked.  It is 
imperative that agreements requiring consideration typically occur between 
strangers or business acquaintances (that is, people who negotiate at arms-
length) and not among family or friends, which is of course the province of 
most gratuitous transfers.  The context within which each transfer arises not 
only establishes the contours of the transfer and provides evidence of 
motive and purpose, but the context dictates the formalities that must be 
present for a transfer to late be validated by the courts.  Consequently, the 
context plays a key role in dictating the formalities that are required to 
effectuate a valid transfer and those formalities, in turn, perform a 
functional role, not only at the time of the transfer (ex ante), but also ex post 
when either one or both of the parties are unable to testify regarding the 
details or validity of the challenged transfer128 or when the parties have a 
conflicting view regarding whether an enforceable agreement was 
reached.129 
To prove this point, this Article turns specifically to inter vivos gifts 
and then testamentary transfers to compare them with a contract or 
consideration-based transfer. 
III.  COMPARING CONTRACTS (ENFORCEABLE TRANSFERS-
CONSIDERATION REQUIRED) TO INTER VIVOS GIFTS AND 
TESTAMENTARY TRANSFERS (ENFORCEABLE TRANSFERS-
NO CONSIDERATION REQUIRED), WHAT GIVES? 
Determining what is a mere gratuitous promise and, hence, 
unenforceable is also something of a tautology,130 and worthy of a lengthy 
analysis131 that is beyond the purview of this Article.  Suffice it to say, a 
 
the document or writing to constitute the decedent’s will . . .”  Id. § 2-503.  This is important 
because it means that as long as the evidentiary function can be satisfied by different means, the 
formal or functional requirements are dispensed. 
128.  Here, this Article refers to inter vivos gifts and testamentary transfers in which the 
putative donor is deceased.  This is discussed further infra Part IV. 
129.  Here, this Article refers to contract disputes where the initial issue is not breach but 
formation. 
130.  See supra Part II and text accompanying.  Again, it is only when the court later 
determines that a promise is deemed unenforceable that it then becomes “gratuitous” and 
unenforceable.  If the promise is deemed to be enforceable it is ipso facto not gratuitous.  See 
Hamer, 27 N.E at 257. 
131.  See FERRIELL supra note 3, § 3.04. 
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promise by a father at his daughter’s birthday to pay for her law school 
tuition that is not induced by any action or forbearance on the daughter’s 
part is just such a gratuitous promise and unenforceable ex ante.132 
Therefore, the result is universally accepted, notwithstanding the 
rationale in support of the result.  Hence, the presence or absence of 
consideration (which, after all, is yet another tautology)133 is irrelevant to 
the question of the enforceability of gratuitous promises.  These promises 
are not within the province of contracts and are justifiably policed by moral 
as opposed to legal suasion.134  Determining which promises are deemed 
gratuitous has more to do with the preexisting relationship of the parties and 
the context within which the promise is made, rather than the substantive 
content of the promise which, in the right setting between different parties 
in a different relationship, may be later judged as a non-gratuitous promise 
supported by consideration.135 
But then how are completed gratuitous promises treated by courts and 
commentators?  Are those enforceable?  Yes, but they are not called 
gratuitous promises, unenforceable or not.136  Instead, they are called 
gifts.137  These gifts, like certain testamentary transfers (i.e. Wills or 
testamentary bequests that are previously discussed)138 are indeed enforced 
by the courts.139 
As a result, there are actually three types of agreements or transactions 
that raise questions regarding enforceability.  First, there are agreements 
 
132.  Ex ante is stated because if the daughter subsequently relies on the promise to her 
detriment, she may be able to state a claim based on estoppel or reliance.  See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
133.  See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text. 
134.  FRIED, supra note 43. 
135.  As explained in the companion article, Johnson, supra note 22, gratuitous promises can 
be divided into two types.  The first type of unenforced promises are gratuitous promises that are 
uncompleted during the promisor’s life.  Id.  In this case, the promisor bears the full brunt of the 
reputational effect of not honoring her promise by subsequent act.  Id.  The second type of 
gratuitous promise that is unenforceable is that promise that is uncompleted because of a change 
in circumstances, typically the death of the promisor, that was not contemplated or internalized at 
the time the promise was made.  Id.  This latter type of gratuitous promise has bedeviled the courts 
and created cases like Hamer and others in which the testator’s executor is refusing to honor the 
promisor’s commitment.  Hamer, 27 N.E at 257.  As previously explained, these cases do not raise 
issues involving consideration.  Id.  Instead, these case should be treated as uncompleted gift cases 
primarily because of a change of circumstances or frustration of purpose, i.e., putative donor dies 
before effectuating a valid deliver.  Unfortunately, however, property law does not recognize these 
two doctrines or apply them to gift transfers.  As a result, courts reflexively applying property law 
doctrines refuse to find a completed gift thereby leaving the issue to be decided by employing 
contract law with doctrines that are ill-suited for the task.  Id. 
136.  See infra notes 160-168. 
137.  Id. 
138.  See infra notes 168-178 and accompanying text. 
139.  Id. 
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typically made between strangers with no preexisting or long-term 
relationship that are required to be supported by consideration and, as a 
result, are then enforceable by the courts (commercial contracts).140  
Second, there are agreements between parties that have a preexisting 
relationship which are deemed unenforceable gratuitous promises because 
no actions were taken by the donor or promisor to validate his or her intent 
to make the gift.141  Third, there are completed gratuitous acts or promises 
that represent valid inter vivos gifts or testamentary transfers that are 
enforceable ex post because the donor did take the necessary action to 
validate his or her intent to make either a valid inter vivos gift or 
testamentary transfer.142 
Some examples will illuminate this thesis.  For whatever reason, a 
father promises his daughter that he will buy her a brand new car if she 
graduates from high school and makes the honor roll list.  Indeed, the father 
states that he will purchase and give the daughter the car if she receives all 
“A” level grades her senior year.  The daughter, recognizing that she has 
little interest in History and will not likely receive a grade above “B+” 
responds by asking whether the father will make the gift if she receives one 
grade of  “B+”?  The father agrees and the promise is made (the entire 
negotiation takes place) at the daughter’s sweet sixteen birthday party with 
the entire family, and assorted neighbors and their children in attendance.  
In addition, the parties “shake on it” (that is, the father’s promise and the 
parties’ agreement) in full view of several attending witnesses.143 
The daughter, up to that date an indifferent student, redoubles her 
academic effort motivated by the promise of new wheels, buckles down, 
and subsequently graduates on the honor roll with all “A’s” and a “B+” in 
History.  The father, discovering that the daughter is dating another woman, 
a relationship he is highly critical of, reneges on the promise and refuses to 
deliver the car unless the daughter terminates her relationship with her new 
 
140.  This refers to contingent or discrete contracts—that is, one time or limited transactions.  
These are not what are characterized as long-term relational contracts that may call for different 
interpretative rules because of the ongoing relationship in which the contracting parties adjust 
their respective behavior based on that relationship.  There is literature on relational versus 
contingent contracts, but the best place to start is with Charles Goetz & Robert A. Scott, 
Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981). 
141.  See infra notes 160-178. 
142.  Id.  Gratuitous acts or promises that are incomplete are unenforceable gratuitous 
promises.  Id.  It is only when the promise is actualized or completed by undertaking certain 
formalities that the gratuitous act or promise becomes either an enforceable gift or an enforceable 
testamentary transfer.  Id.  That determination can only be made ex post and not ex ante since 
intent must be proven to validate the transaction.  Id. 
143.  This is in an attempt to clearly establish a fact pattern or hypothetical in which the 
proof of the promise that induces action is largely indisputable and easily proven. 
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lady-friend.  The daughter, indignant over her father’s meddling in her 
personal affairs, brings suit to enforce the father’s promise, which he does 
not deny.144  It safe to conclude that in every jurisdiction the father would 
prevail and the daughter would, in the absence of other facts, be bereft of 
any meaningful remedy against the father, notwithstanding the fact that a 
bargain was struck between the two parties.145 
The refusal by all courts to enforce the father’s promise represents a 
puzzle and problem if the doctrine and requirement of consideration and the 
bargain theory is taken seriously.  It suffices to say that all elements of 
consideration are met in this hypothetical.  But what occurs when the 
hypothetical is somewhat altered to illuminate even more problematic 
issues?  Assume for the sake of argument, that before the father discovers 
the existence of the daughter’s relationship with her female friend, he 
makes good on his promise by purchasing and delivering to his daughter the 
car keys .146  The next day, before the car is physically delivered by the 
dealer, the father discovers the existence of the offending relationship and 
in a fit of pique attempts to rescind his gift.  If the father brings suit to 
rescind the gift, he will lose because every court in the nation would find 
 
144.  Although there are certain intra-family promises deemed enforceable later by a court, 
almost all such promises are enforced following the death of the promisor before the promise is 
performed.  These intra-family promises are addressed in Johnson, The Legality of Contracts 
Governing the Disposition of Embryos, supra note 2.  In almost all other cases, intra-family 
promises are deemed to be unenforceable by the courts. 
145.  In fact, other than charitable subscription cases, see, e.g., Dougherty v. Salt, 125 N.E. 
94, 94 (N.Y. 1919), it is almost impossible to find a case where a putative donor expresses an 
intention to make a future gift, changes her mind, and later declines to make same, and is then 
sued by the putative donee who is made aware of the intention to make the gift contemporaneous 
with the putative donor’s expression.  This, assumes of course, that there is no detrimental reliance 
on the promise by the putative donee.  One can also posit that detrimental reliance should not be 
used in this context because the promisee daughter is actually better off as a result of the father’s 
inducement—she achieved better grades.  See discussion infra Part V.  There are of course several 
cases in which the putative donor expresses an intent to make a gift under certain expressed 
conditions, dies, and the executor is sued when the conditions are met.  That is the classic fact 
pattern in Hamer, and is better addressed as a case involving the issue of which donee, the inter 
vivos donee or the testamentary donee, should be given the subject property.  Hamer, 27 N.E at 
257; see supra note 25; see infra Part V.  The point to be made is that there are literally no cases 
where a donor expresses an intent to make a gift, later repudiates, and is then sued, forget 
successfully, by the putative donee.  When the putative donor is alive, the donee just doesn’t 
sue—there is no credible claim to be made.  When the putative donor dies in the interim and the 
estate is sued, the real issue is whether the putative donor would have wanted the gift to be 
completed notwithstanding the change in circumstance—the putative donor’s death—that has 
occurred.  That is a different and more complicated issue that is addressed briefly in Part V and in 
greater detail in the companion article.  See Johnson, A Trichotomy of Reliance Promises, supra 
note 22. 
146.  Assume for the sake of discussion that delivery of the keys to the daughter constitutes 
both a symbolic and constructive delivery of the car and completes the act of delivery necessary to 
find a valid gift.  The requirement of delivery in a completed gift is discussed infra notes 160-168 
and accompanying text. 
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that the unenforceable gratuitous promise became a completed and 
enforceable gift once delivery took place and the car is accepted by the 
daughter.  Here, delivery is complete upon what is characterized as 
constructive delivery through the conveyance of the keys, which gives the 
daughter the means of access to the car.147 
The seminal distinction between the two situations described above is 
that the father’s promise to make a gift of the car is deemed unenforceable 
if the gift is not completed by the dual acts of delivery (actual, symbolic, or 
constructive), on the part of the donor148 and acceptance, on the part of the 
donee.  In the latter case in which these two requirements are met, the 
courts will hold that a valid gift has been made and refuse to cancel or 
negate the completed transaction.  The gift is non-revocable and the donor 
cannot make a successful claim that enforcing the gift results in unjust 
enrichment to the donee, regardless of whether the donee has done nothing 
to “earn” the subject of the gift and the legal conclusion that the transaction 
lacks the legal glue of “consideration.”149  Key to this analysis, however, is 
a recharacterization of the court’s refusal to modify or rescind the gift 
transaction once it is completed.150  This should be viewed as a positive act 
of the court in enforcing the promise made by the father.151  The father, for 
 
147.  In this case, timing is indeed everything.  Just as importantly and as discussed in more 
detail below, there are very few cases that address this exact fact pattern pursuant to which a 
donor who completes a gift, later attempts to revoke or modify same; see infra notes 160-168 and 
accompanying text.  Indeed, it is hornbook law that a completed gift cannot be undone.  Melvin 
Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 17 (1979).  In almost all litigated cases, the 
donor is dead and the battle is between the putative donee and the intestate takers of the donor if 
the donor dies without a Will, or the residuary legatee if the donor dies with a Will and without a 
specific bequest addressing the disputed item.  If there is a specific bequest in the Will devising 
the previously gifted item to a devisee, the question will be whether the bequest is deemed.  UNIF. 
PROB. CODE § 2-606 (amended 2010). 
148.  Actual delivery occurs when the item that is the subject of the gift is capable of manual 
delivery and the item is physically delivered from the donor to the donee.  Symbolic delivery 
occurs when the item is not capable of physical delivery (think, piano) and a symbol like a piece 
of paper expressing the gift is given to the donee and that is the only physical delivery that takes 
place.  Constructive delivery occurs when the item is not capable of manual delivery and the 
donee is given the means to access the item and obtain same (think key to a safe deposit box). 
DUKEMINIER, ET. AL., supra note 76, at 164-65. 
149.  For the sake of argument, the claim that by accepting the gift the donee incurs a legal 
detriment that satisfies the rubric of consideration is ignored and may be irrelevant if the focus in 
on the bargain principle rather than the benefit/detriment test.  For a discussion of the bargain 
principle and its enforceability via the benefit/detriment test, see supra notes 94-101. 
150.  If the father wanted to make a revocable gift and determine when said gift should be 
revoked, he should have been counseled to use a revocable trust designating himself as trustee and 
settling the trust with the car as the res and the putative donor as the trustee of the revocable trust. 
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 36, at 440-68. 
151.  The fact that there are similarly no successful cases in which the donor seeks return of 
the gift could of course mean that the unhappy donor who made the completed gift was successful 
in retrieving the item from the donee when he later changed his mind and sought return of the item 
gifted—this could happen in a close-knit family situation to preserve family harmony.  However, 
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example, cannot later claim that the daughter has been unjustly enriched if 
she retains the automobile and seeks its return on that basis. 
One last example completes this triptych.  Thus far, this Article has 
addressed an uncompleted gift transfer and a completed gift transfer.  
Assume that when the father makes the promise to gift the car to the 
daughter should she achieve the status of an honor roll student, he is very ill 
and near death.  So, in order to assure that his promise is kept should he die 
before the daughter graduates, he adds a valid addendum, called a 
codicil,152 to his valid Will in which he states that it is his wish that the 
daughter be given the automobile should she make the school’s honor roll. 
If the father dies before the daughter’s graduation with the codicil still 
in effect, the executor of the father’s estate must later determine whether the 
daughter did indeed graduate on the honor roll.  If so, the car will be 
delivered to the daughter by the executor of the estate, if not, the daughter 
does not receive the car.  In other words, the “gratuitous” promise will be 
enforced later by the probate court even if the father’s executor discovers 
the daughter’s offending relationship and claims that the father, a noted 
homophobe, would have objected and withheld delivery of the car.153  That 
duck will not quack and the executor will be bound by his or her fiduciary 
duty to perform the promise by delivering the car to the donee-daughter.154 
In a suit between the daughter and the executor, the daughter will 
prevail.  So, in this case, courts do enforce the gratuitous promises, but they 
do not call it a gratuitous promise or treat it as such.  Instead, courts 
characterize this gratuitous transfer as a testamentary bequest and claim to 
 
given human nature, the value of the item given, and family dynamics, it is not a given that a 
family member would return an item—reverse a gift transaction—simply when asked to do so.  
The fact that there are no reported cases in which the donor seeks to reverse the gift transaction is 
instead better proof that such donors are advised not to waste their money when the gift is made; 
that their time is better spent attempting to retrieve same through informal mechanisms because to 
resort to the legal system will be spectacularly unsuccessful given the fact that a completed gift 
has been previously made. 
152.  UNIF. PROB. CODE § 1-201(57) (amended 2010). 
153.  Assume for the sake of argument that the father, while alive, delivered a note to his 
future executor expressly stating that he wished to cancel the bequest if his daughter is guilty of 
what he considers an act of moral turpitude including engaging in same sex acts.  Such a note does 
not qualify as either a valid codicil to his Will changing its provisions or a revocatory act 
sufficient to invalidate the bequest in the Will.  See UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 2-507 & 2-508 
(amended 2010). 
154.  Indeed, in the famous iconic cases such as Hamer v. Sidway, discussed supra note 23-
24 and accompanying text, the reason those cases are considered contract rather than estate cases 
is that the promisor did not have the foresight to memorialize the contentious promise in his or her 
estate plan.  That lack of formality is key to the resolution of those cases.  See infra notes 160-68 
and accompanying text. 
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be enforcing the testator’s intent by enforcing his last Will and 
Testament.155 
To be clear, this situation is quite distinct from a situation where the 
father makes the same promise and before the daughter makes the honor 
roll, the father dies without a Will or without changing the Will to reflect 
his intent to make the gift.  In this situation, we have a gratuitous promise 
that was not completed before the putative donor’s death—like, for 
example, the one described in this triptych.  The donor’s death represents a 
changed condition but has no impact on the legality of the gratuitous 
promise made by the putative donor.156  In these cases, if there is a dispute 
between the executor of the putative donor’s estate who presumably refuses 
to complete the gift, as intended by the putative donor, then it is not 
enforceable and the executor is charged with completing and performing 
only legally enforceable obligations of the estate.157  If the basis of a claim 
against an estate is a gratuitous promise that is ipso facto unenforceable, the 
executor’s completion of the gift would subject the executor to a successful 
claim by the decedent’s heirs, if he died intestate, or legatees if he died 
testate.158 
In cases where there is a validly executed Will and the executor is 
simply carrying out those wishes, it is the existence of the validly executed 
Will that serves as the basis for a valid future transfer of the property to the 
 
155.  See Johnson, The Legality of Contracts Governing the Disposition of Embryos, supra 
note 2, at 237.  What’s in a name?  The fact that this is called a testamentary bequest should not 
obscure the fact that this is essentially a gift transaction.  It is not an inter vivos gift, since it takes 
place after the death of the donor, nor is it a gift causa mortis (one made in contemplation of death 
but while the donor is still alive).  This gift takes place and becomes effective only at the instant of 
the donor’s death when a court later determines that the testator died with a valid Will.  The 
relation-back doctrine of Will enforcement is addressed in Johnson, Is it Time for Irrevocable 
Wills?,  supra note 115. 
156.  As noted and discussed, see infra notes 168-78 and accompanying text, this fact pattern 
can generate cases in which the promises are subsequently enforced by the courts even when 
delivery has not been completed due to the death of the putative donor before delivery can be 
effectuated.  The exemplar of this fact pattern is Hamer. 27 N.E at 257; see supra note 23-24. 
157.  DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 36, at 43. 
158.  Id.  The fact that the executor is subject to a claim by either heirs of legatees if the gift 
is completed by the executor predisposes the executor to inevitably refuse a request to complete a 
gift transaction in this setting.  Saying no forces the putative donee to go to court to enforce the 
gift and if the putative donee is successful, a court order to effectuate the gift immunizes the 
executor from a subsequent lawsuit.  Just as importantly, the asset that is the subject of the gift is 
removed from the decedent’s estate and given to the putative donee affecting a change in assets 
between the competing donee and the heirs or legatees.  No assets of the executor are involved 
and from the executor’s perspective it is irrelevant who gets the asset as long as there is no 
possible liability for the executor.  If, however, the executor more generously completes the gift 
because of a belief that it comports with the decedent’s intent, that act will be subject to later 
challenge by the heirs and legatees and the executor may be personally liable for the value of the 
gift.  Hence, it always behooves the executor to say no and force the court to decide.  That is the 
common fact pattern in cases like Hamer. 27 N.E at 257; see supra note 25. 
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putative donee following the testator’s death.159  The uncompleted gift 
transaction is deemed to be largely irrelevant from the perspective of the 
executor and the courts in effectuating the actual transaction or transfer of 
the gifted item.  Instead, the validly executed Will serves as the focal point 
for a determination of whether the item Will be transferred to the donee—
now deemed “devisee” because of the placement of the future gift in the 
Will.160  Functionally, a completed gift and a completed testamentary 
transfer serve the same purpose and are deemed effective for somewhat 
similar reasons. 
In both cases there is no claim of consideration and no claim on the 
part of the donee or legatee, depending on the case, that the donee or legatee 
merits, or has somehow earned, the item that is the subject of the gift or 
bequest.  This is the epitome of the so-called sterile transaction that is 
unenforceable as a gratuitous promise but enforced as a completed gift or 
testamentary transfer only if the putative donor complies with certain 
formalities.161  These formalities for the two different types of transfers are 
described in greater detail below. 
This section is titled, in part, Inter Vivos Gifts and Testamentary 
Transfer (Enforceable Transfers-No Consideration Required) and the 
reference to these agreements as “Enforceable Transfers” is intentional.  
Perhaps this section should be titled “Valid Enforceable Agreements 
Unsupported by Consideration.”  The intent, however, is to draw particular 
attention to the fact that the only separation of these transactions from 
contractual or consideration-based transactions that are deemed enforceable 
is the alleged lack of consideration, however consideration is defined by the 
arbiter.162  Assuming that the promisor possesses the requisite intent to 
make a transfer, that intent does not differ in intensity and nature from the 
intent that the promisor has in making a bargained-for transfer that is 
deemed to be supported by consideration and is therefore enforceable.163 
 
159.  DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 36, at 43-48. 
160.  UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-605 (amended 2010). 
161.  See supra notes 106-109. 
162.  Irrespective of which consideration formula is used by the applicable court, see supra 
notes 94-101 and accompanying text, no finding of consideration will be reached. 
163.  One can quibble that when the donor intends to make a gift, what is lacking is an 
agreement with another party or entity, and it is the absence of the other party or entity that makes 
a gift different from a contract that is enforceable.  That, of course, ignores the fact that certain 
unilateral contracts are deemed enforceable when supported by the consideration.  FRIER & 
WHITE, supra note 3, at 38.  In addition, the absence of an agreement between two parties does 
not preclude courts from utilizing the doctrine of promissory estoppels to enforce promises made 
by one party without obtaining a reciprocal promise.  See infra Parts V for a discussion of the use 
of promissory estoppel by the courts. 
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Yet, this species of promise or agreement—typified by the father’s 
promise to transfer the car to the daughter, should she make the honor roll 
¾is deemed unenforceable unless the donor complies with certain 
formalities, including intent, delivery, and acceptance to effectuate a valid 
and enforceable inter vivos gift or transfer.164  If the donor wishes to make a 
gift to an individual or entity effective after the donor is dead, the gift can 
be validated as long as the gift transaction is properly memorialized in a 
validly executed Will.165  Consideration is not required in order to validate 
the now future testamentary gift. 
The two reasons why both inter vivos gifts and testamentary transfers 
are validated are the formalities associated with each transaction and the 
situational context of the gift or testamentary transfer given the relationship 
of the parties to the gift or testamentary transfer.  First turning to the 
formalities with respect to gifts, intent, delivery, and acceptance, and 
attestation with respect to Wills, all provide the evidentiary and 
corroborative predicate to find a valid transaction.  It is generally accepted 
that once the “formality requirements” are met, courts have little trouble in 
finding a valid transaction.166 
The most important point about these two transactions that often goes 
overlooked or ignored, is the absence of an exchange between the parties, 
characterized as putative donor and putative donee, be it inter vivos (gift) or 
testamentary (Will).  The mere fact that there is no quid pro quo in these 
two transactions means that what is being exchanged for the gift or bequest 
is nil, now or later.  And that nil does not have to be measured; it has no 
value because nothing, except perhaps gratitude, is being exchanged.  The 
 
164.  Although gifts are historically categorized as either inter vivos—made while the donor 
is alive—or gifts causa mortis—gifts made in contemplation of death, the focus herein is on inter 
vivos gifts for several reasons.  First, the differing requirements and treatment of gifts causa 
mortis seem to be disappearing from the law.  This is probably so because the importance of gifts 
causa mortis has been lessened by the ease of the creation and use of revocable inter vivos trusts.  
Pursuant to these trusts, grantors can easily designate takers upon death but retain, in essence, total 
control over the asset up to the instant of death including the possibility of revoking the gift should 
the donor or trustor not die of the anticipated peril.  For a discussion of revocable inter vivos 
trusts, see DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 36, at 440-68.  In addition, the differing 
requirements for a gift causa mortis, including that the donor be motivated to make the gift 
because of fear of imminent peril or the possibility of demise, and that the putative donor perish 
from the anticipated peril in order to complete the gift, are largely irrelevant to the issues 
addressed herein.  For a discussion of gifts causa mortis, see DUKEMINIER, ET. AL., supra note 76, 
at 198. 
165.  The rest of the article will assume that the decedent-donor resided in a state that has 
adopted the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) and that the Will executed by the decedent-donor, 
whether holographic or non-holographic, complies with the formalities, such as attestation, that 
are required by the applicable UPC code.  UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-502 & 2-503 (amended 
2010). 
166.  DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 36, at 148-53. 
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thing being given establishes the value of the transferred item.  The intrinsic 
value of the transferred item is unique to the gift, whether inter vivos or 
testamentary.167 
The fact that the putative donee has promised nothing in exchange for 
the gift or the testamentary bequest means nothing has to be measured or 
assessed by the court in determining what needs to be transferred in order to 
complete either the gift transfer or the testamentary bequest.168  Indeed, 
what is quite striking about both inter vivos gifts and testamentary transfers 
is that the formalities requirements associated with each are neatly 
calibrated so that the function each serves has the effect of identifying and 
credibly establishing the item that is being transferred.  This allows a court 
to later (ex post) determine the ownership, not the value, of the item in 
question.  That question of ownership is what is being litigated and decided 
in the dispute. 
Focusing first on inter vivos gifts, the three requirements of intent, 
delivery, and acceptance do more than corroborate the gift or provide 
evidence of the intent to make a gift.  These requirements establish the 
contour, the identity, and the limits of the gift.  By requiring delivery and 
acceptance to effectuate a valid gift, both the putative donor and putative 
donee must identify the thing being transferred with specificity and also 
agree on the boundaries of what is being transferred.169  Delivery requires 
the donor to make the identity of the proposed gift certain and concrete.170  
In other words, the putative donor cannot make a gift of something 
indistinct like, for example, “things that I want you to have because they are 
perfect for you” without positively identifying those things in a more 
deliberate and exacting fashion.  Failure to positively identify the item or 
items gifted results in no gift because no matter how certain the donor’s 
intent, it is impossible for both the donee and any third party (court or 
arbiter) to ascertain the object of that intent.  Moreover, that intent cannot 
be clarified by the donor if the putative donor dies shortly after making the 
 
167.  To a large extent the remedy enforced in donative transactions is very similar to the 
remedy sought in a specific performance action.  Thus, there is no need to place a price or value 
on the item that is the subject of the dispute.  The winner of the dispute obtains that item, thereby 
obviating the need for valuation.  See Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 351, 360-62 (1978). 
168.  In the gift transaction, the donee has not made a bargain in order to obtain the gifted 
item.  In this sense, the donee is only a promisee and not a promisor and there is no bilateral 
agreement or contract.  For a discussion of the bargain theory of consideration, see supra notes 
94-101. 
169.  The act of delivery requires the donor to specify what is being gifted and is positive 
evidence of that fact.  Philip Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of 
Choses in Action Evidenced by Commercial Instruments, 21 ILL. L. REV. 341, 348-49 (1926). 
170.  Id. 
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statement supporting the intent to make a gift of those things ‘perfect’ for 
the putative donee.171 
Acceptance of the gift by the donee likewise fixes the scope of the 
thing being transferred.  It requires the putative donee to delimit the item 
being accepted by requiring the donee to make a conscious or deliberate 
choice to take dominion, control, and usually present ownership over the 
thing being transferred.  In order to convey the valid acceptance, the 
putative donee must be made aware of the scope and identity of the item 
that is being voluntarily transferred.  And even though there is no 
bargained-for exchange with respect to a gift, the acceptance requirement 
mandates that there is the equivalent of a meeting of the minds (similar to 
an agreed-upon bargain) with respect to the item being voluntarily 
transferred.  That means the donee must accept the gift proffered, no more, 
no less.  Thus, the donee cannot partially accept a gift, nor can a donee 
expand the scope of the gift beyond that intended to be transferred to the 
donee and it is presumed that the donee accepts the gift when the gift has 
positive value.172 
Essentially, the same requirements are present in a valid testamentary 
transfer.  In order to effectuate a voluntary future testamentary transfer,173 
the formality requirements mandate that the putative testator identify the 
items contained within her estate and the takers of such items, even if that 
identification is something as broad as a residuary clause, by which the 
testator gives “the rest and residue of her estate to her best friend, Karen.”  
By using even a broad and vaguely worded clause,174 the testator has 
 
171.  Indeed, if this Article focused solely on the formalities associated with gift transfers, 
the analysis would be expanded to demonstrate why constructive and symbolic delivery are 
allowed and substituted for actual delivery.  This also adequately explains why a putative donor 
may make a gift of a future interest in a current possession like a painting which was the subject of 
just such a gift in Gruen v. Gruen, 496 N.E.2d 869 (1986).  Both constructive and symbolic 
delivery serve the function of defining precisely, by objective indicia, what is being transferred.  
Similarly, the requirements that must be complied with to make a delivery of valid future interest, 
serve the same function. 
172.  RICHARD HYLAND, GIFTS: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LAW 493-95 (2012). 
173.  This is an attempt to differentiate involuntary testamentary transfers, which occur when 
the decedent dies intestate, without a Will.  In this situation, the state of the decedent’s domicile at 
the time of death, dictates the taker(s) of the decedent’s estate through off-the-rack default rules 
known as intestacy provisions.  See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-101 & 2-105 (amended 2010).  
The takers of the decedent’s estate are deemed “involuntary” to the extent that there is no 
evidence that the decedent opted or chose to select these intestate takers to receive her property.  
The only thing known, with any degree of certainty, is that the decedent died without a validly 
executed Will.  Whether that means that the decedent intentionally opted into the default rules 
provided by intestacy statutes is untestable. 
174.  A Will, unlike most other documents, effectuates a transfer of title of the testator’s 
property, and is both revocable and ambulatory.  Although a Will’s revocability is accepted as 
normal, ambulatory in this context means that will can dispose of after-acquired property.  As to 
its revocability, what is interesting about a Will is that it cannot be made irrevocable.  For a 
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identified the taker, Karen, and the items to be taken— everything she owns 
at the time of her death that she has not specifically bequeathed to others in 
her Will.175  And, although most lay persons are not aware of this 
requirement, similar to inter vivos gifts, testamentary gifts must be accepted 
by the donee or legatee before they can be completed.176  Thus, a 
testamentary gift requires the same identification (certainty) of the item 
being bequeathed, as well as acceptance (meeting of the minds) of that item 
by the putative donee or legatee (completion).177  Consequently, both 
formalities associated with gratuitous inter vivos and testamentary transfers 
serve the function of identifying the item transferred to reduce any 
uncertainty regarding what is being transferred even the donor is dead.178 
More importantly, these similar functional requirements serve identical 
purposes.  The functional requirements are designed to limit the 
administrative and error costs associated with these transactions, in which 
no exchange of items (no bargained for exchange) is made between the 
putative donor and donee.  In other words, in transactions in which only one 
transfer is being made, from donor to donee or testator to legatee, the only 
issue to be adjudicated is the nature and extent of the asset to be transferred.  
The formality requirements are designed to furnish information to the 
arbiter or trier of fact by providing assurance that if a transfer is validated, 
both the administrative costs associated with making that determination and 
any error costs associated with that decision are de minimis. 
Recall that in cases involving inter vivos gifts, as well as cases 
involving testamentary gifts, the possibility of error arises because the 
putative donor is more than likely deceased and unable to state her past or 
current intent.179  Hence, the possibility of error is most likely to occur 
 
discussion of this issue, see Johnson, Jr., Is it Time for Irrevocable Wills?, supra note 115, at 409-
10. 
175.  DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 36, at 374. 
176.  See UNIF. DISCLAIMER OF PROPERTY INTERESTS ACT (UDPIA) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
1999) which was incorporated into the UNIF. PROBATE CODE in 2002 as Article 2, Part III §§ 2-
1101-2-1107, replacing § 2-801. 
177.  Given that a testamentary bequest can be disclaimed, id., the choice not to disclaim is 
the equivalent of acceptance and is required to complete a valid bequest. 
178.  It is obvious and redundant to state that the testator is dead in cases involving 
testamentary bequests and Wills.  It is not so obvious, that the putative donor will be dead in cases 
adjudicated involving alleged inter vivos gift transfers.  However, and as noted previously supra 
notes 166-74 and accompanying text, there are no cases in which a live putative donor is sued by 
the putative donee after the putative donor states he is repudiating the gift because his intent has 
changed.  Quite the contrary, the putative donor’s death before the gift can be completed 
represents a changed condition, supra notes 160-65 and accompanying text, that was not 
anticipated by the putative donor. 
179.  For a discussion of why this is more than likely the case, see supra notes 160-78 and 
accompanying text. 
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when those interested in obtaining the item that is the subject of dispute, 
claim the item as an inter vivos gift or testamentary transfer and the 
deceased owner is unable to positively refute such a claim.  By proving that 
the donor complied with the requisite formalities, the testamentary 
formalities place the burden on the individual claiming the donative 
transaction to prove the validity of the transfer and the donor’s intent.180 
It is important to realize that in adjudicating an inter vivos gift claim or 
testamentary transfer claim, the real parties in interest are the individuals or 
entities claiming that the transfer took place, and the decedent’s heirs or 
testate takers.  The putative donor or testator is out of the picture due to her 
death, and the only question is who will be substituted as the next owner or 
occupant of the item(s) that are the subject of the dispute.  Discerning 
which party was the intended recipient when competing claims are made 
cannot be performed with one hundred percent certainty because the 
putative donor is dead.  A court can make inquiries amongst the decedent’s 
friends and relatives to try to make an ex post determination about whether 
the transfer alleged was intended, but the cost of that determination would 
be very high and more than likely produce highly indeterminate results.181 
The formality requirements make quick resolution of this issue and 
provide a determination that minimizes the possibility of error by placing 
the burden on the party claiming a transfer to prove that the requisite 
formality requirements were accomplished.  Failure to do so, will result in 
the property being transferred to the testator’s heirs or legatees, which is the 
equivalent of a majoritarian default position that society has embraced.182  
In other words, if no valid inter vivos gift can be proven, the presumption 
enforced by the court is that the property becomes part of the donor’s estate. 
Turning now to the contextual dimensions of these transfers, what is 
often overlooked in a comparative discussion of gifts or gratuitous transfers 
versus contracts, are the two different contexts that produce these transfers.  
It is the context that drives the functional or formal requirements of each of 
these transactions.  For example, inter vivos gifts occur in a typical setting 
that has two important attributes or characteristics.  First, although there are 
anonymous gifts (usually to institutions or charities),183 most gifts of 
 
180.  DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 36, at 147-53. 
181.  After the decedent’s death, parties’ motivation and memories may change depending 
on the circumstances and cause conflicting testimony and evidence to be adduced regarding the 
putative donee/testator’s true intent and wishes. 
182.  Ian Ayres &  Robert Gertner, Majoritarian and Minoritarian Default Rules, 51 STAN. 
L. REV. 1591, 1591-93 (1999). 
183.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“A 
charitable subscription or a marriage settlement is binding . . . without proof that the promise 
induced action or forbearance.”).  These anonymous gifts are said to be truly altruistic as opposed 
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donative transactions involve family members or individuals who have had 
a preexisting long-term relationship.  That stands to reason because most 
people do not give away their assets to strangers.  The preexisting 
relationship is important for several reasons.  Given the multiple 
interactions that occur between the parties in several domains over an 
extended period of time, statements can be made that are taken out of 
context to support the allegation that a gift has been made.  How often does 
one say to one’s child or lover, “If I could give you the moon, I would?” 
Second, since donative transfers do not focus on an exchange of things 
or promises, the putative donee must demonstrate that the donor not only 
transferred the item by delivering it, but that the donor had the requisite 
intent to transfer.184  This means that if there is a dispute later regarding 
whether there is a valid donative transfer, the putative donor can dispose of 
the issue by simply stating that he or she had no intent to make such a gift.  
If the transfer lacks intent, there is no gift—it is that simple.  Perhaps that is 
why there are no cases in which the putative donor is alive and claims that 
she did not intend to make a gift.  That case would be disposed of on a 
motion for summary judgment.185 
This means that in most, if not all of the litigated cases involving 
donative transfers, the putative donor is dead and unable to testify at any 
trial concerning the validity of the gift.  This also means one additional 
thing: since the donor is dead and has no need for the item in the afterlife, 
the real parties in interest in a dispute over the alleged gift are, again, the 
putative donee and the putative donor’s intestate heirs or testate takers.  If 
the gift is validated, the donor’s estate will not include the gift.  Even if 
there is a specific bequest of the gifted item in the Will to someone else, 
that item will be ‘adeemed’ in the testator’s Will, i.e., that is treated as not 
in the testator’s estate because of the transfer that took place prior to the 
testator’s death.186 
 
to other gifts which are made to enhance one’s reputation (reputational), or benefit the donor by 
providing the donor with a feeling of beneficence (beneficent), or made with the expectation of 
receiving a return gift (reciprocity).  Id. 
184.  If the putative donor claims he gave something of value in exchange for the gifted item, 
he is alleging that this is a contract supported by consideration. 
185.  Better yet, no attorney would file suit in such a case recognizing what a waste of time 
and resources it represents. 
186.  Ademption occurs when the testator specifically bequeaths an item that is not in his 
estate.  See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-606 (amended 2010).  In other words, one’s Will can leave 
Dodger Stadium to her husband but unless she owns Dodger Stadium at the time of her death, the 
dispositive provision in the Will is ineffective to transfer Dodger Stadium to her husband.  Items 
of personalty and realty that were once owned by the testator but are not owned by the testator at 
the time of her death are treated similarly. 
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Consequently, and here’s the payoff, the inter vivos gift transfer, even 
though it is an inter vivos gift transfer, looks remarkably similar to a 
testamentary transfer when it is challenged later.  In the testamentary 
transfer setting, if there is a challenge to one of the testator’s bequests or the 
validity of the Will or a codicil, the question is who among the donor’s 
heirs, relatives, friends, or acquaintances will receive the disputed 
item(s).187  Thus, with respect to inter vivos gifts and testamentary transfers, 
there is no question that the item which is the subject of the dispute will not 
be returned to the putative donor or testator because that individual is dead.  
Instead, the issue will be who among the living relatives, friends and 
acquaintances will receive the item given that no one has paid for or 
contracted for the transfer of the item.  The situation is complicated because 
of the donor or testator’s death and the fact that he or she cannot testify or 
contradict any statements made by the competing claimants to the disputed 
item.  How does one make a determination regarding transfer of the 
deceased property without viable input from the decedent?  How does the 
court get it right? 
Now, this Article will examine the formalities required to establish the 
validity of these two different transactions: gifts and testamentary transfers.  
As previously noted previously and discussed,188 to establish a valid gift the 
donee must establish intent, delivery, and acceptance.  The burden of proof 
is placed on the donee to demonstrate that, there was an intent to make a 
gift.  This can obviously be accomplished in a variety of ways, including 
testimony of the donee as to what was said by the donor contemporaneous 
with the delivery of the gift.  Intent, however, is not the key requirement 
because it is subjective and the donor is dead.  The key requirement is 
delivery.189 
The delivery buttresses any claim by the donee that the donor intended 
a gift.  The fact that the item has been physically transferred to the donee 
shifts the burden to the party challenging the transfer to show that the donor 
had no such intent to make a gift.190  Delivery thus serves as the fulcrum for 
 
187.  If the testator has died with a Will and a specific bequest—a transfer to a named 
individual—is successfully challenged, the gift fails and “falls” into the residuary clause, i.e., the 
rest and residue of my estate to X.  If the entire Will or the residuary clause is successfully 
challenged, the testator will be deemed to have died intestate with respect to the items passing 
pursuant to the invalid residuary clause or Will.  In this case, the assets will then pass to the 
testator’s intestate heirs, i.e., the default-takers of the decedent’s estate identified by statute.  See 
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-101(a) (amended 2010). 
188.  See supra notes 166-74 and text accompanying. 
189.  See Mechem, supra note 169, at 348-49. 
190.  In the litigated cases there is little question that the donee has accepted the gift.  Indeed, 
the presumption in most cases is that the donee has accepted the gift.  See HYLAND, supra note 
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the court to make a determination regarding whether a transfer has indeed 
occurred.  It provides objective evidence that a transfer has or has not been 
made.  That, of course, does not mean that the objective evidence, i.e., that 
the donee has the item in question, is foolproof or always dispositive.191  It 
does mean that the court has a principled means to make a determination in 
the most difficult circumstances—when one of the principal parties is not 
available (due to the putative donor’s death) for corroboration or 
evidentiary purposes.  The requirement of delivery necessary to validate the 
transfer satisfies the corroborative and evidentiary purposes.  If the putative 
donee has the item, there is a strong presumption of a gift transfer with the 
requisite intent.  If that is not the case, the burden is on the intestate or 
testate heirs to prove otherwise.192 
The same essentially applies to testamentary transfers.  The Wills Act 
established the requirement of attestation of the document signed by the 
testator with two or more witnesses.193  It likewise later (ex post) supplies a 
court with sufficient evidence to make a principled determination as to the 
disposition of the testator’s assets by placing the burden of proof on the 
party seeking to invalidate the Will.194  The formalities required to establish 
a testamentary transfer are vehicles or paths by which courts navigate these 
difficult disputes to reach a principle and, hopefully, correct decision. 
By focusing on the remedy sought by the parties, in the case of 
donative and testamentary transfers that means determining ownership, the 
functional role of the requirements necessary to validate the transfer reveals 
a normative base that is telescopic.  At one end of the telescope is the ex 
ante position of the parties when the transaction is taking place.  The 
 
172, at 493-95.  Failure of the donee to accept the gift would not produce any litigation over the 
validity of the gift. 
191.  The donee, for example, could have stolen the item or taken it without the knowledge 
of the donor.  Alternatively, the donee could have come into possession of the item following the 
death of the putative donee. 
192.  For example, they may be able to demonstrate that the item was stolen or taken without 
permission. 
193.  These requirements are embodied in the UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-501-2-503 
(amended 2010).  Indeed, Section 2-503 dispenses with the requirement of witnesses, if sufficient 
evidence to discern testator’s intent can otherwise be proven.  It must be highlighted that once the 
evidentiary function is otherwise satisfied the formalities associated with the execution of the Will 
are also dispensed.  Thus, the Uniform Probate Code is quite clear on the view that the functions 
of attestation are evidentiary.  UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 2-501, 2-503 (amended 2010). 
194.  There are a number of ways that the Will can be challenged.  First and foremost, the 
party challenging the Will can allege that the attestation process was not properly complied with 
including, but not limited to, proving that the testator did not sign the proffered Will because it is a 
forgery or that the testator did not know he or she was signing a Will because there was fraud in 
the inducement.  Of course, there are other ways to challenge a validly executed Will by showing 
that the testator lacked the mental capacity to make the Will or that the executed Will was the 
product of undue influence, etc.  See UNIF. PROB. CODE Part 5 (amended 2010). 
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formalities are designed to inform the parties of the importance and legal 
effect of their actions at the time they are made.  At the other end of the 
telescope is the ex post position when the court is called to adjudicate the 
dispute given the absence of one of the key parties to the transaction.  Here, 
not only are the interests of the parties impacted and affected, but the 
interests of others as well. 
This Article now turns to consideration and the formalities required to 
prove that it has been established.  Assume for the sake of argument, that 
the bargain theory of consideration is the only way to establish 
consideration.  This simplifying assumption allows the Article to focus on 
the process that produces the bargain—the negotiations that take place 
between the promisor and the promisee that results in an exchange of 
promises.  For example, Able agrees to sell his car to Baker for $5000.00 
and their agreement is reduced to writing, specifying that the car is to be 
delivered to Baker one year after the execution of the agreement that is 
signed by both parties.195  Ex ante, at the time of contracting, both Able and 
Baker are aware of the serious nature of the transaction because of their 
negotiation and the reduction of their agreement to writing.  Executing the 
agreement brings home to each, their promise to perform pursuant to the 
terms of the agreement (cautionary function). 
Moreover, the fact that the agreement will be reduced to writing raises 
issues regarding whether the agreement reflects the true intent of the parties 
executing same.  If there is a question regarding the written agreement, 
either party can use standardized forms that have previously been 
interpreted and have a settled interpretative meaning196 or they can have 
their respective attorneys draft language that insures their intent is properly 
memorialized per the terms of their agreement (the channeling function).  
The existence of the agreement serves as evidence that an agreement was 
reached by and between Able and Baker.  Furthermore, the terms of the 
agreement are proven by the writing (evidentiary function). 
The recognition that consideration serves these functional roles is not 
novel.197  However, what is often lost in the discussion of the functional 
role of consideration is that the requirements necessary to effectuate a Seal 
are also satisfied by the requirement of consideration in the hypothetical 
 
195.  The existence of the writing satisfies the requirement of the Statute of Frauds that is 
embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 110.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 110 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
196.  On the virtue of the interpretation of standardized forms versus customized 
formulation.  See FRIER & WHITE, supra note 3, at 180-81. 
197.  See Fuller, supra note 4, at 799. 
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bargain between Abel and Baker.198  The execution of the written 
agreement proves each party’s intent to enter into the agreement and to be 
bound by the terms of the agreement.  Similarly, and assuming each party 
has a copy of the executed agreement, there is delivery of the document to 
the other, the surrender of which signifies to promisor that the deal is final.  
Finally, the acceptance of an executed copy by the promisee in this bilateral 
contract (each party in this case) causes both Abel and Baker to be bound. 
The fact that intent, delivery, and acceptance are present, binds these 
transactions to inter vivos gift transfers and testamentary transfers that are 
addressed in Part IV.  Suffice it to say, the fact that these three requirements 
are met in each of these transactions, later allows a court to efficiently and 
correctly adjudicate a dispute that might arise between the parties by 
initially determining whether there was an enforceable agreement.199  Those 
three requirements are necessarily met in the arms-length transaction that 
represents the hypothetical bargain between Abel and Baker because either 
party has incentive ex post to act opportunistically200 depending on events 
that have occurred subsequent to the execution of the contract. 
In situations involving inter vivos gifts and testamentary transfers 
courts are faced with the evidentiary hurdle of deciding the validity of such 
transfers: one party to the transaction is deceased and her “live” testimony 
cannot be made before the court.  Therefore, the court is faced with two 
opposing stories regarding the intent of the putative donor that cannot be 
verified by relying upon the testimony of that donor.  With respect to gifts, 
the act of delivery ensures that the intent of the putative donor is as claimed 
by the putative donee in the absence of any other evidence.201  With respect 
to the testamentary transfer, in lieu of the testator’s testimony compliance 
with the formalities mandated by the Wills Act,202 suffices to document and 
 
198.  See supra notes 64-77 and accompanying text. 
199.  Subsidiary questions such as the interpretation of the agreement and whether the 
agreement can be performed or has been breached can only be addressed once the seminal 
question of whether consideration has been found. 
200.  Opportunistic behavior is behavior of a performing party to an agreement that is 
“contrary to the other party’s understanding of their contract, but not necessarily contrary to the 
agreement’s explicit terms, leading to a transfer of wealth from the other party to the performer.”  
Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521, 521 
(181). 
201.  For the sake of simplicity, this Article ignores symbolic and constructive delivery of 
the item that is the subject of the gift and instead focusing on actual delivery of the item that is the 
subject of the gift. 
202.  The original Wills Act enacted in 1837 required a writing signed by testator at the end 
thereof (subscription) and witnessed by two individuals.  DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 36, 
at 149. 
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prove the intent of the testator.203  In other words, ex post the adjudicating 
court uses these requirements of form to ensure that it can make the 
correctly and efficiently decide the outcome of the case. 
In comparable situations involving a contract dispute, however, both 
parties are before the court but each has a strong incentive to convince the 
court that their view on the validity of the contract is correct.  
Notwithstanding the existence of perjury and the moral suasion on truth-
telling, the court has no independent way of divining which party is telling 
the truth or which parties’ recollection of events is accurate.  Enter 
consideration, which allows the court to make the correct and efficient 
decision regarding the enforceability of the alleged contract or agreement.  
The three requirements of intent, delivery, and acceptance are verifiable 
signifiers of the existence of such an agreement.  The formality 
requirements supply objective and verifiable evidence of an agreement that 
can be subsequently evaluated by the court in light of the circumstances that 
caused the parties to enter into the agreement. 
To prove this point, the Article will turn to inter vivos and testamentary 
transfers that establish the baseline by which contractual agreements are to 
be judged. 
IV.  CONSIDERATION RECONSIDERED: AN EXPANDED 
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH FOCUSING ON RIGHTS AND 
REMEDIES 
So far, this Article has demonstrated that consideration is a formality 
that is required at formation to ensure a valid contract.  In so doing, this 
Article joins a long, and some might add prestigious, line of scholarship 
that focused on the formal or functional role of consideration as its 
normative base.  However, contrary to what is standard thinking, the 
consideration formality does serve a purpose beyond evidentiary, 
cautionary, channeling, and ritualism: it is functional.  To date, however, 
scholars have focused on the functional role played by the formalities as the 
parties enter into the transaction—characterized here as the ex ante position 
of the parties.204  The functional role is much broader in scope than 
 
203.  The Uniform Probate Code has supplanted the Wills Act in a majority of states.  For 
example, under the UPC, the formalities required to execute a valid Will have been lessened.  See 
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502 (amended 2010).  This, however, does not impair the argument 
regarding the functional role served by these requirements because the lessening of formalities 
allows validation of a Will when there is clear and convincing evidence of intent that the Will 
represents the testator’s intent.  DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 36, at 150-53.  As such, the 
UPC can be said to recognize and adopt the approach that when the court is satisfied with the 
proof of the testator’s intent, the Will can be deemed enforceable.  Id. at 152-53. 
204.  See supra notes 92-104 and text accompanying. 
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previously considered.  The additional function it serves is to provide an 
effective remedy in the case of breach.205  The absence of consideration 
does not mean no contract, it means no enforceable contract, and, hence, no 
remedy enforced by the court.  This becomes clear when comparing gift 
promises that are enforced, gift promises that are not enforced, and the use 
of promissory estoppel to enforce promises admittedly lacking 
consideration. 
This Article will further demonstrate that consideration’s additional 
functional purpose is to supply the court with an effective and efficient 
remedy in the case of a breach.  To accomplish that goal, a brief review is in 
order before turning to contracts supported by consideration.  There are 
certain formalities associated with valid inter vivos gift transfers.206  The 
formality requirement associated with gift transactions serves the functional 
purpose of identifying with certitude the item voluntarily transferred from 
the donor to the donee.  The formality requirements associated with a valid 
testamentary transfer serve a similar purpose of identifying both the item 
being transferred and the recipient of the item.  The formality requirements 
associated with both transactions allow a court to later validate the transfer 
at low cost and with little change of adjudicative error. 
Starting with the assumption that X is the owner of real property and 
proving ownership beyond any doubt, that ownership interest provides X 
with the power to make inter vivos transfers as well as testamentary 
transfers.207  The inter vivos transfers can be one of two types given the 
current characterization of transactions.  First, the transaction can be 
characterized as a gift transaction in which title and ownership of the item 
are transferred to another, with the donor receiving nothing material in 
return.208  The second type of inter vivos transaction is a bargained-for 
 
205.  See infra notes 223-34 and text accompanying. 
206.  See supra notes 166-74 and text accompanying. 
207.  The power to make testamentary transfers was not always a given.  It is only with the 
execution and acceptance of the Statute of Wills in 1540 that testators were given the power to 
make transfers that became effective upon the testator’s death.  STATUTE OF WILLS (1540). 
208.  Although gifts are said to be altruistic with the donor receiving nothing in return for the 
gift, it is actually incorrect to say the donor receives nothing in exchange for making a gift.  First, 
there is the emotional benefit created when the gift is transferred.  It is beyond cavil that the donor 
will not make a gift if it makes her feel worse or makes her worse off than she was before the gift.  
Given that this is indeed a gift and a truly voluntary transaction, there would be no incentive to 
make the transaction if there was no positive benefit to the donor.  See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, 
Donative Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6 n. 17 (1979).  Second, there are reputational effects 
that make the donor better off when she makes a gift.  Meaning that the donee’s view of the 
donor’s reputation is enhanced as a result of the gift.  See Posner, supra note 103, at 412.  Third, 
many gifts are given with the hope that a gift will be received in return (so-called reciprocity 
gifts).  HYLAND, supra note 172, at 19.  Consequently, when stating that the donor received 
nothing material in return, to be more precise, this means that the donor does not receive a 
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exchange that is typically characterized as an enforceable contract.209  That 
is, the original owner, X, receives something in return as an inducement to 
transfer ownership of the subject property and its use to Y.  The third type 
of transfer is the transfer that occurs at death—the so-called testamentary 
transfer.210  This transfer looks much more like the first transfer in that the 
owner, X, will not receive anything in return for the testamentary gift other 
than perhaps gratitude from the donee or legatee.211 
In the first transaction, the gift transfer, if the matter is disputed or 
litigated, the person characterized as the putative donor is more than likely 
dead.212  The same is obviously true of the testamentary transfer: the 
putative donor is dead.  This is obvious in the testamentary transaction but 
not as obvious in inter vivos donative transaction.  If the putative donor is 
alive when the dispute arises regarding whether X has transferred an 
ownership interest to Y, one would start with the assumption that X is the 
owner and can prove that fact to the satisfaction of all concerned.  To 
overcome the assumption of ownership by X, Y has the burden of proving 
that a transfer of ownership has occurred.  Y can do this by claiming one of 
two alternatives. 
First, Y can claim that X made a gift to him, expecting nothing in 
return.  However, since intent to make a gift is one of the formality 
requirements, if X is alive and disputes this account there is ipso facto no 
gift.213  This is why there are no gift cases in which the putative donor is 
alive and the putative donee claims a gift that is contrary to the putative 
donor’s claim of ownership, meaning no gift.  The other avenue is a 
bargained-for exchange in which Y claims that he is entitled to the item 
 
material quid pro quo (res) as a precondition or contemporaneous condition at the time the gift is 
made. 
209.  FRIER & WHITE, supra note 3, at 33-36. 
210.  DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 36, at 147-53. 
211.  A limited exception to the donative testamentary transfer arises when X, our putative 
testator, contracts to make a Will and dies in compliance with the contract.  In this situation, X 
may agree to leave her estate to Z if Z agrees to make a Will that is reciprocal, meaning upon his 
death, his estate will be left to X.  In this situation, both parties, are in a contractual relationship, 
not a donative relationship.  DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 36, at 256-58; UNIF. PROB. 
CODE § 2-514 (amended 2010). 
212.  See supra notes 180-84 and accompanying text. 
213.  The fact that a gift is more than likely to arise in situations where X and Y have a 
preexisting relationship that motivated the animus to make a gift—provided donative intent—
influences whether Y makes a claim against X while X is alive because by doing so Y most likely 
terminates the relationship and the benefits that flow from it.  This type of end-game strategy in an 
iterative long-term relationship can occur, but likely will not occur, because the donor is 
presumably in a superior economic position and it makes little sense for the donee to assert an 
ownership interest contrary to X if doing so may anger X.  A discussion regarding parties in long-
term relationships and that impact on the legal issues raised by this Article are addressed infra Part 
V. 
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from X because, in exchange for the item, he provided something to X.  In 
order to prevail, this contracts-based approach requires Y show that there 
was consideration for the agreement and the existence of a contract.214  Y 
must then document that she promised to give, do, or fail to do something 
in exchange for the property, and that the act or inaction had been 
communicated to X.  That exchange of the property must be proven to 
establish a contracts-based agreement. 
Continuing the focus on the donative transaction as opposed to the 
bargained-for exchange is more like the testamentary transaction in terms of 
proof given the death of the original owner, X.  In both inter vivos gift 
transfers and testamentary transfers, the death of the putative donor creates 
an evidentiary issue that could conceivably flummox a court and lead to 
inconsistent and, some might argue, incoherent results.  Because of the 
donor’s death, there is no recourse to contemporaneous or “live” testimony 
of the donor, so the court is faced with two narratives regarding the alleged 
donative transfer.215  In the absence of probative and reliable evidence, the 
choice between the two narratives would be indeterminate leading to the 
inconsistent and incoherent judicial outcomes. 
Although the resolution of the typical contract dispute does not 
normally involve a deceased party (it can happen, however), there is a 
similar problem presented to the adjudicating court although both parties 
are alive and present before the court.  Both parties have different 
interpretations regarding the enforceability and/or performance of the 
agreement that is the subject of the dispute.  And if the dispute is over the 
validity of any such agreement, the requirement of consideration will 
determine whether there was or was not such a valid agreement.216  
Consideration, at this later adjudicative point, must be proven by the person 
seeking to establish that there is indeed a valid agreement.  Again, it is a 
rule of proof217 that the party seeking enforceability of the agreement must 
 
214.  For this discussion, the Article ignores any claim by Y that he is entitled to a remedy 
due to promissory estoppel. 
215.  A few years ago there was a fierce debate regarding the use of narratives in legal 
scholarship.  For a defense of narrative in that context, see Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the 
Use of Narrative and Giving Content to the Voice of Color: Rejecting the Imposition of Process 
Theory in Legal Scholarship, 79 IOWA L. REV. 803, 830-42 (1994).  This Article does not revisit 
the debate that the court must decide between two narratives in adjudicating cases involving gifts 
and testamentary transfers.  Instead, this Article makes the more simplistic and accurate claim that 
in these cases the courts are presented with two different interpretations of the decedent’s actions 
and must choose one or the other as the “truth”—one that presents the picture of a completed 
transfer with the intent to make the transfer and one that does not, with no intent to make the 
transfer in a manner lawfully recognized by the court. 
216.  FRIER & WHITE, supra note 3, at 32-36. 
217.  FERRIELL, supra note 3, at 63-66. 
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establish by a preponderance of the evidence.218  Under the bargain theory 
of consideration,219 the bargain not only brings home to the promisee that 
he or she is entering into an enforceable agreement (protective and 
channeling), it also provides evidence of the agreement and the value of the 
agreement, which is later important for establishing an appropriate 
remedy.220 
Once an agreement is validated through the use of consideration, each 
party to a bilateral contract221 is provided with rights arising from that 
enforceable contract.  The primary and most simplistic way of thinking 
about the rights provided by the contract is its enforceability by each party.  
Although there are several reasons to enforce an individual’s 
promise¾morality222 and efficiency223 are primary among them—this 
Article takes as given that promises made should be enforced.  Moreover, 
because the promise can later be enforced against the wishes of the person 
who made it, the person seeking to enforce the promise has a “right” that is 
protected by a liability rule.224  That right to enforce the agreement creates a 
valuable interest in the party seeking its enforcement.  But that right is not 
self-executing. 
Of course, there is no right to be protected unless the court can fashion 
an effective remedy to protect it.  This symbiotic relationship is recognized 
most prominently in constitutional law.  In an influential article,225 
Professor Daryl Levinson persuasively demonstrates that constitutional 
 
218.  Id. 
219.  FRIER & WHITE, supra note 3, at 32-36. 
220.  See infra Part V and accompanying text. 
221.  FRIER & WHITE, supra note 3, at 38. 
222.  FRIED, supra note 43. 
223.  COOTER & ULEN, supra note 49, at 194-96. 
224.  Liability rules differ from property rules according to the Calabresian nomenclature, 
see Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: 
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972), given that property rules allow 
the holder of the right to retain the right and only transfer it at a price deemed acceptable to the 
holder of the right.  Compare, however, liability rules that allow a third party, in this case, the 
court to enforce the rights by forcing a transfer of the right per the terms decided by the third 
party.  Id.  In the contracts context, property rules become liability rules as a result of the 
agreement or contract.  In our example involving Abel and Baker, Abel’s interest in his car was 
initially protected by a property right.  Abel was not and could not be forced to sell his car to 
Baker even if Baker offered $50,000 or $500,000 for a car with a Bluebook value of $4000.  
However, once Baker enters into a valid contract to purchase the car for $5000, Abel’s interest in 
the car is protected by a liability rule.  In other words, Baker can force Abel to sell him the car for 
$5000 and Abel has the reciprocal right to require Baker to pay $5000 for the car on the agreed 
upon date or compensate him for any harm suffered for his failure to do so on that date or when 
Baker repudiates the agreement. 
225.  Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. 
REV. 857 (1999). 
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rights cannot be separated from the remedies used to enforce those rights.226  
The right or remedy connection is so strong that Professor Levinson 
documents that the content and contour of certain constitutional rights are 
severely impacted by the remedy used to enforce them.227 
As Professor Levinson documents, the determination that there is no 
right without a remedy and that the two are functionally inseparable, was 
established very early on by Oliver Wendell Homes in his article, The Path 
of the Law,228 which stated: “[A] legal duty is nothing but a prediction that 
if a man does or omits certain things he will be made to suffer in this or that 
way by judgment of the court; — and so of a legal right.”229  A remedy is 
what is referred to as “this or that way” by Justice Holmes.  When a 
promisor decides to breach, the promisor has essentially chosen not to 
perform and instead pay the price for breaching.  In Guido Calabresi and 
Douglas Melamed’s seminal work, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,230 the authors expand on 
Holmes’s insight by showing how decisions about rights or entitlements are 
interrelated with decisions about remedies in the fields of property, torts, 
criminal law, and other areas of the law.231 
The goal herein is not to articulate a theory of the relationship between 
rights and their accompanying remedy in various legal areas, including 
constitutional law.  Instead, the goal is to demonstrate that the same 
symbiotic relationship is present between rights and remedies in private 
agreements including contract rights enforced by courts.  Thus, one 
claiming an interest that arises as a result of an agreement reached with 
another is claiming a “right” that has arisen as a result of that contractual 
agreement reached.  That right or interest in the agreement is only valid and 
effective if the court can fashion an effective remedy to protect it.  
Consideration is the vehicle that establishes the worth of the right and 
provides the court with an assessment of its value to provide a remedy for 
the party injured as a result of the breach. 
 
226.  “In this view, constitutional rights are inevitably shaped by, and incorporate, remedial 
concerns.  Constitutional adjudication is functional not just at the level of remedies, but all the 
way up.”  Id. at 873. 
227.  “Rights are often shaped by the nature of the remedy that will follow if the right is 
violated . . . What the Brown right ‘really was’ at that point is a question that cannot be answered 
meaningfully without describing the attendant remedies.”  Id. at 874-76.  And,”[a] subtle inversion 
of right and remedy thus occurs.  Remedies are used by the court to define a constitutional 
standard that would otherwise be impossible to articulate, and those remedies become the 
normative criterion by which constitutional violations are judged.”  Id. at 880. 
228.  Supra note 227. 
229.  Id. at 458. 
230.  Id. 
231.  Levinson, supra note 225, at 859. 
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Without “consideration” courts would have no way of assessing 
damages for breach of the contractual rights that were created by the 
executed agreement.  Returning to the hypothetical involving Abel and 
Baker, and the contract to sell a car for $5000, the respective value they 
place on each promise is contained in the agreement and that value is 
consideration for the other’s promise.  That value also establishes the 
remedy for breach if it should subsequently occur.  In the hypothetical 
agreement, Baker agrees to buy the car for $5000.  If Abel takes any action 
which ultimately precludes the transfer to Baker, such as selling the car to a 
third party, the previously negotiated price of $5000 becomes the value 
used for measuring damages should Baker sue for breach of contract.  If a 
similar car could be purchased at a minimum price of $6000, Baker can 
establish damages of $1000.  Thus, the proof that Baker made a good deal 
is the agreement between the parties that they negotiated.  A court does not 
need to make an independent assessment of the value that the parties placed 
on the car at the time of contracting.  The court must simply obtain 
objective evidence of the value of a similar automobile at the time of the 
breach.  Again, this ex post functional role both minimizes error and 
adjudicative costs. 
An examination of the typical testamentary gift transaction, that is a 
bequest pursuant to a valid Will, and a comparison to what is deemed to be 
a valid gift, reveals that in both transfers the court is not called upon to 
adjudicate the value of the item being transferred.  Instead, the court is 
being called upon to adjudicate ownership of the item that has been 
allegedly transferred by either the live or now dead donor.  Compare and 
contrast contract-based transfers.  In those transfers, the initial ownership of 
the item is not in question.  What is in question is whether the two parties in 
dispute have reached an agreement to transfer ownership in the item from 
one party to the other.  If so, the party against whom the promise is 
enforced, is then liable in damages to the other.  Those damages are 
established and verified by the “consideration” that the parties agreed on for 
the item.232  The court does not have to expend any resources in 
establishing the value of the item. 
Consideration, like the functional formalities required to validate inter 
vivos gifts and testamentary transfers serve a dual role.  In addition to the 
ex ante functional roles of channeling, ritualistic, and protective, the 
 
232.  Although beyond the scope of this Article, an argument can be made pursuant to this 
thesis that the functional reason for the remedial use of specific performance is that the items that 
are the province of specific performance have no market value by which damages can be 
established.  Compare the arguments made for the use of specific performance in Kronman, supra 
note 167. 
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formalities serve an ex post role by identifying with specificity the item to 
be transferred.  To further buttress the contention that the doctrine of 
consideration serves an ex post evidentiary role, this Article turns to 
examine a transaction that lacks consideration but is nevertheless enforced 
by the courts pursuant to the principle of reliance.  Reliance based transfers 
are enforced in large part because the promise made by the promisor 
provides and limits the scope of the remedy.  This reduces the adjudicative 
and error costs in determining which fair and just promises to enforce. 
V.  PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL: FUNCTION OVER FORM 
There is yet another type of transfer that is enforced or validated by the 
courts but is not based on a traditional contract or agreement.  Clearly, this 
unique transfer is not supported by consideration and no claims are made 
that consideration is necessary for its validity.  Interestingly enough 
however, this third type of transfer is not a donative transfer, either inter 
vivos or testamentary, and therefore does not satisfy the formality 
requirements requisite to those transactions.  This transfer is unsupported by 
consideration, yet not donative.  It is enforced by the courts although it 
lacks the formality requirements of donative transfers with no viable proof 
of consideration; it is a transfer validated by the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel or, reliance. 
Much academic233 and judicial ink234 has been spilled over the use and 
efficacy of Section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts which 
provides in part: 
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce 
action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person 
and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if 
injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.  The 
remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.235 
 
233.  See, e.g., L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract 
Damages: 1, 46 YALE L. J. 52 (1936); Melvin Aaron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and its 
Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1982); E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of 
Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145 (1970); Stewart McCaulay, The Reliance Interest and the 
World Outside the Law Schools’ Doors, 1991 WIS.  L. REV. 247; W. David Slawson, The Role of 
Reliance in Contract Damages, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 197 (1990); Randy E. Barnett & Mary E. 
Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estoppel. Contract Formalities, and Misrepresentations, 15 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 443 (1987). 
234.  Three representative cases each representing a different sort of reliance, which is 
discussed infra notes 253-89, including Rickets v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898), Cohen v. 
Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. 1992), and Midwest Energy Inc. v. Orion Food Sys., 
Inc. 14 S.W.3d 154 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000). 
235.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
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In brief, Section 90 is much decried and criticized for allowing courts 
to enforce promises that are not supported by the traditional notion of 
consideration.  Indeed, the expanding use of the reliance or promissory 
estoppel doctrine to enforce agreements lacking consideration has been said 
to create a loophole so large that it obliterates the consideration doctrine.236  
Almost all agree that what unites these promissory estoppel cases is that 
there is some impediment to enforcing the promise relied upon as a valid 
and enforceable contract because some element necessary for contract 
formation, normally bargained-for consideration, is lacking.237 
These promissory estoppel cases, however, differ from the two types of 
donative cases discussed previously—gift and testamentary transfers—
because the focus is not on the promisor’s intent and acts, but on the actions 
of the promisee.238  When those cases are contrasted to inter vivos gifts, 
testamentary transfers, and formal contract transfer, there is a lack of 
formality requirements.  Although an exhaustive review of the cases is 
beyond the scope of this Article, what is apparent is that the promissory 
estoppel cases cover a wide range of fact patterns and scenarios that are 
largely incapable of synthesis into one category with homogenous facts.239  
Promissory estoppel cases also do not raise univocal legal issues.  
Nevertheless, a review of the literature reveals that the cases employing 
promissory estoppel as a remedy can be largely grouped into three 
categories: uncompleted donative transactions, promises made in 
commercial settings, and misrepresentations.240  And, although each type of 
promissory estoppel case will be discussed in turn, what is important to note 
is that the lack of formality requirements unifies these cases. 
As noted in Section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contract, 
liability is imposed on the promisor when a promise is made which the 
promisor reasonably knows will induce action or forbearance by the 
promisee, and the promise does indeed induce such action or forbearance on 
the part of the promisee.241  Hence, the elements necessary to establish 
promissory estoppel are: first, a promise; second, a promise intended to 
induce reliance which is reasonably foreseeable at the time the promise is 
 
236.  Most famously Grant Gilmore declared that the reliance and estoppel doctrine 
embodied in Section 90 caused the death of the law of contracts. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH 
OF CONTRACT (2d ed. 1995). 
237.  FERRIELL, supra note 3, at 135-38. 
238.  Id. at 141-42. 
239.  Id. at 143-54. 
240.  This is the reason for selecting the three cases stated supra note 234 and accompanying 
text. 
241.  FERRIELL, supra note 3, at 141. 
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articulated; and third, reliance in the form of action or forbearance in the 
manner reasonably anticipated. 
Although one can argue that a promisor seeking to induce reliance can 
be viewed minimally as a “formality requirement”242 that triggers the use of 
the promissory estoppel doctrine, that minimal level of specificity—a 
promise which the promisor is cognizant should induce reliance—does not 
identify which promises are enforceable pursuant to the doctrine and which 
not.243  This does not inform or illuminate why certain promises are deemed 
to be enforceable pursuant to the doctrine and others not. 
Finally, the mere fact that a promise is made with the intent to induce 
reliance that causes such reliance does not identify any item bargained for 
given that there is no bargain between the promisor to the promisee.  
Instead, what the promisor seeks is some action on the part of the putative 
promisee which may or may not be forthcoming, but the promise itself does 
not seek to establish the contours of the promisee’s subsequent action.  The 
promise is controlled by the promisor but the subsequent “reliance” actions 
are within the province of the promisee and may or may not rise to the level 
of reasonableness to create an actionable charge. 
So, what exactly is required for the use and validation of promissory 
estoppel, and why?  Just as importantly, what is it about promissory 
estoppel cases that aligns them with inter vivos gift cases and testamentary 
transfers?  What can be learned from the absence of formality requirements 
and what has it to do with the requirement of consideration in contracts?  
These are important questions.  The answers to which may provide insight 
into the contract formation question of why is consideration required for 
valid contract? 
The starting place is what unifies the three types of cases that most 
often employ promissory estoppel: donative transactions, promises made in 
commercial settings, and misrepresentations.  The actions taken by the 
promisee in reliance on the promise that can be precisely measured later by 
a court to provide an effective remedy, are what unites and validates 
promissory estoppel cases.  The differences between the three types of cases 
are the contexts which generate these three types of Section 90 cases.  
Moreover, it is the context that provides the key to understanding these 
three categories of cases and allows the contention that only one of the three 
categories considered under Section 90 is valid.  The other two classes of 
 
242.  That is, a promise must be made by the promisor. 
243.  Furthermore, even if one was able to clearly identify such promises, the existence of 
the promise is not enough to trigger Section 90.  One would still need to show reasonable reliance 
on the part of the promisee.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (AM. LAW INST. 
1981). 
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cases do not and should not belong in contract law but find themselves 
included in contract law’s domain for reasons that are addressed in greater 
detail in a companion article.244 
There are three categories of promissory estoppel cases: donative cases 
(property), misrepresentation cases (torts), and transactional cases 
(contracts lacking consideration).245  Each type of case represents a form of 
an agreement that subsequently goes awry and causes harm or injury to the 
putative promisee.  However, each arises in a different setting.  The 
donative case arises most often in a family or family-like setting.  The 
misrepresentation case arises in a variety of settings that can only be 
grouped by what they are not: they do not arise in a family or family-like 
setting, nor do they arise in a typical transactional setting.  The transactional 
case arises in a transactional or business setting. 
In fact, this Article joins a growing list of scholarship that contends the 
category of cases classified as misrepresentation cases are in fact best 
considered and dealt with as tort cases.246  As detailed below, these cases 
should be considered torts absent one fact: the parties have the opportunity 
to voluntarily negotiate or transact before the harmful (tortious) act occurs.  
The voluntary and preexisting nature of the relationship between the 
putative promisor and promisee causes courts and commentators to miscast 
these promises as “agreements” that provide a remedy under Section 90 of 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.247  Instead, these promises should 
be treated as a species of tort that require no animus or intent of the alleged 
tortfeasor, who is not deemed strictly liable because the reliance shall be 
foreseeable, reasonable, and actually incurred resulting in a loss. 
Moreover, there is support for this new species of tort-based, not 
contract-based, promise in public policy arguments.  Just as certain 
otherwise valid agreements are unenforceable because they violate public 
policy,248 so-called agreements that are otherwise unenforceable because 
they lack a necessary element, should be deemed enforceable for public 
policy reasons.  However, consistent with this thesis herein, if the remedy is 
not supplied by the agreement or if the remedy is measured by the injury to 
the “promisee” who relies on it, that remedy calls for the imposition of tort 
damages decided by the trier of fact based on the harm occasioned by the 
injurer or promisor. 
 
244.  See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
245.  FERRIELL, supra note 3, at 152-54. 
246.  Id. at 134-38. 
247.  Id. at 162-64. 
248.  See discussion supra note 2 and text accompanying. 
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Thus, this type of promise should not be covered by Section 90 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts and is miscast as an agreement that is 
enforceable pursuant to its doctrine.  Just as the Uniform Commercial Code 
has come to grips with cases that are fair in form but foul in execution,249 
courts should honestly state that they are providing equity, not enforcing a 
contract, when enforcing promises or representations made that cause 
reasonable reliance in a non-business, non-family context if a failure to do 
so would produce an unconscionable result.250  Because the remedy is 
measured by the harm created, the promises should be viewed as tortious 
and not contractual.  There is also no reliance by the injured promisee and 
no proof needed to obtain a recovery from the promisor.  The fact that 
expectation damages are not created or measured by cases employing 
promissory estoppel is dispositive of the true nature of the legal right that is 
formed when the “promisee” claims harm or damages. 
Two cases illustrate the “tortious” nature of legal claims generated by 
this category of cases.  The first is the aforementioned Cohen v. Cowles 
Media Co.,251 and the second is the less-known, Grouse v. Group Health 
Plan, Inc.252  Coincidentally, both are Minnesota cases.  In Cohen, a fairly 
complicated case that this Article will simplify, the promisor reporter, 
agreed to maintain the anonymity of a source who informed him of 
salacious details of a candidate for public office.253  Instead of maintaining 
anonymity, the reporter divulged the name of the source which resulted in 
the source being humiliated and fired from his job.254  The source’s two 
hundred thousand dollars verdict was affirmed by the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota based on a theory of promissory estoppel.255 
The problem with employing the theory of promissory estoppel in that 
case is that the reliance had nothing to do with the detriment incurred by the 
 
249.  See U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) which states: 
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have 
been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the 
contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable 
clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any 
unconscionable result. 
250.  Indeed, this Article argues that the courts should recognize the doctrine of 
conscionability and enforce promises when it is fair to do so focusing on the equities presented by 
the promisee.  See Johnson, A Trichotomy of Reliance Promises, supra note 22. 
251.  479 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. 1992). 
252.  306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981). 
253.  Cohen, 479 N.W.2d at 388-89.  The case was on remand from the United States 
Supreme Court.  A more complete recitation of the facts of the case are set out in Cohen v. Cowles 
Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 200-02 (Minn. 1990), rev’d, 501 U.S. 663 (1991). 
254.  Id. at 389. 
255.  Id. at 392. 
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promise.  The promisee relied on the reporter’s promise to maintain the 
source’s anonymity in turning over the information to the reporter.256  The 
harm occurred when the reporter, actually the newspaper editors over the 
reporter’s objection, broke the promise and revealed his identity that 
resulted in his being fired: the detriment.257  Turning over the information, 
which was the action taken in reliance on the promise, was clearly not the 
detriment complained of, though it was clearly the action taken in reliance 
on the promise.  Interestingly, the Minnesota’s Supreme Court’s affirmation 
of the judgment holds that the reporter’s promise to maintain anonymity 
must be enforced to prevent injustice.258 
Tellingly, in Cohen, the parties were not in a business relationship (the 
reporter did not pay the source for the information that Cohen provided), 
nor was one anticipated.  This was clearly a discrete transaction in which 
Cohen possessed information that would have no value after it was 
disclosed and published.  Hence, the factual context was unlike the 
transactional cases that are discussed below.259  Similarly, the parties had no 
previous relationship that would support or induce donative action, by 
either the promisor or promisee.260  This is best viewed as a case in which a 
tort-like duty is imposed upon the reporter to keep his promise to the source 
with a breach occurring because of a failure to do so.  The remedy granted 
to the injured party is measured by the harm created by that breach, rather 
than the cost of reliance incurred by the promisee. 
In Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc.261 the plaintiff applied for a 
pharmacist job with the defendant.262  After interviewing, he was offered 
the job and accepted.263  He agreed to resign from his current job by giving 
two weeks’ notice and turned down another job offer.264  When the plaintiff 
showed up for work, he was informed that someone else had been hired for 
the position and his services were no longer required.265  It is important to 
note that the employment agreement was at-will, meaning that had he been 
hired and employed for that initial day, he could have been fired for any 
 
256.  Id. at 391. 
257.  Id. 
258.  Id. 
259.  See infra notes 263-75 and accompanying text. 
260.  Cohen, 479 N.W.2d 387. 
261.   306 N.W.2d 114. 
262.  Id. at 115-16. 
263.  Id. 
264.  Id. 
265.  Id. at 116. 
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reason or no reason, and would have no cause of action against the 
employer and therefore no damages.266 
Consequently, the parties in Grouse did anticipate entering into a 
business relationship, like the transactional cases discussed below.  
However, the specific business relationship did not provide the putative 
employee with a basis on which to rely because the relationship was at-will 
employment terminable at any time for any non-constitutionally protected 
reason or for no reason whatsoever.267  In other words, given the facts in 
Grouse, any reliance by the putative employee of the promise of 
employment made by the putative promisor must be unreasonable since the 
putative employee had no term contract of employment. 
A better view of Grouse is to characterize it as a public policy case 
and, indeed, a large number of cases in various states follow what is 
characterized as the “public policy exception” to the at-will termination of 
employees.268  As such, a breach of the public policy exception constitutes a 
tort giving rise to remedies, including punitive damages.269  Better than 
promissory estoppel, is the “public policy exception” theory in at-will 
employment cases to provide damages to the injured party when there was 
no reasonable reliance by the promisee.270 
The other type which is often treated as a promissory estoppel case, but 
should not be viewed as a contract or agreement, is a familial promise case 
that cannot be treated as a valid gift because intent, delivery, or 
acceptance271 is lacking.  Ricketts v. Scothorn is the paradigmatic case to 
illustrate.272  Indeed, this category is also responsible for creating a line of 
cases, predating the development and expansion of promissory estoppel, in 
which the court mistakenly, and knowingly, found consideration where 
none was present to enforce an agreement that it deemed worthy of 
protection.273 
This line of cases is best characterized as uncompleted gratuitous 
transfer cases that are incomplete because of a change of circumstances or 
conditions that were unanticipated by the putative donor.274  These cases 
 
266.  For an analysis of at will employment contracts, see Richard A. Lord, The At-Will 
Relationship in the 21st Century: A Consideration of Consideration, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 97, 718-
30 (2006). 
267.  Grouse, 306 N.W.2d at 116. 
268.  PERILLO, supra note 63, at 51-52. 
269.  Id. 
270.  FERRIELL, supra note 3, at 161. 
271.  For a discussion of these requirements, see supra notes 166-74 and accompanying text. 
272.  77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898). 
273.  See supra notes 166-74 and accompanying text. 
274.  Johnson, A Trichotomy of Reliance Promises, supra note 22. 
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should reside in the province of property law and be decided like other 
gratuitous or donative transfer cases.  However, the fact that these cases 
arose at a time when property law doctrines were rigidly and reflexively 
applied, with no thought to equitable or other considerations, often meant 
that form triumphed over substance and lead to determinations that were 
often improvident and unfair. 
One other factor also provided an impetus to choose contract law when 
the choice was between contract law and property law.  Unsurprisingly it 
had to do with the formalities attendant to the two “separate” transactions.  
In property law, it is black letter law that delivery is required to complete a 
valid gift.275  Either the thing is delivered or it is not.  Courts, deploying the 
doctrine of delivery to validate or invalidate gifts, did so remorselessly even 
if it means invalidating a gift where the intent to make a gift was proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt.276  This was accomplished in large part because 
gifts were not viewed as socially valuable as contracts: they were the so-
called sterile transaction that did not create or increase societal wealth.277  
Hence, the channeling function of the requirement of delivery dictated that 
only those gifts that strictly complied with the requirement be validated.278  
Failure to conform with the delivery requirement results in a failed gift. 
Compare this, however, to the evolution of the doctrine of 
consideration in contract law.  Consideration has always been viewed as a 
malleable doctrine used by the courts to enforce agreements when equity 
and or justice requires.279  Indeed, the tautological nature of consideration 
has been stressed throughout and illuminates why putative donees might 
and would prefer their claim to be adjudicated per contract rather than 
property law.280  The fact that the law of contracts had developed to the 
point of employing ends-oriented flexible doctrines, while property law had 
not likewise advanced, provided the necessary space in contract law to find 
these agreements not only contractual in nature, but agreements allegedly 
supported by consideration.  In other words, it is the flexibility of the 
consideration doctrine compared to the inflexibility of the delivery 
requirement in gratuitous transfers that resulted in these familial donative 
 
275.  Even when delivery is met constructively or symbolically, see supra note 148 and 
accompanying text, something that is a symbol or the means of obtaining the gift is transferred 
from the dominion and control of the donor to the donee. 
276.  DUKEMINIER, ET. AL., supra note 76, at 189-91. 
277.  See supra note 105. 
278.  DUKEMINIER, ET. AL., supra note 76, at 189-91. 
279.  See supra notes 30-44 and text accompanying. 
280.  On the tautological nature of consideration, see supra notes 39-44 and accompanying 
text. 
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transfer cases being validated in contract law rather than correctly disposed 
of pursuant to a kinder, gentler, and more flexible property law. 
Thus far this Article has claimed that certain agreements enforced 
under Section 90 should be better considered as torts and treated under tort 
law.281  Somewhat relatedly, this Article has argued that other agreements 
or promises should be judged by doctrines in property law, although these 
doctrines need to be liberalized to accomplish this objective.282  That leaves 
only promises that lack consideration in the business setting as those that 
should be enforced under the rubric of Section 90 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts and that stands to reason given the context that 
generates these promises and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts’ 
purpose in enacting Section 90.283 
These latter cases are best characterized as consideration substitute 
cases in which promissory estoppel serves as a substitute for consideration 
in a setting that would normally be viewed as contractual if consideration 
was supplied.  The genesis for these cases is the repudiation of the doctrine 
of culpa in contrahendo by most courts in the United States.284  Pursuant to 
that doctrine, which is recognized in a number of civil law jurisdictions, 
damages are allowed for injuries sustained as the result of unsuccessful 
negotiations when required by the interests of justice.285  In the United 
States, however, a bright line is drawn between harm created by contract 
negotiations, with no liability, and harm created after a contract is entered 
into between the parties, with liability imposed if a contract is established 
and contractual obligations are breached.286  In effect, the overwhelming 
majority view in the United States is that each party to a negotiation bears 
the risk of any loss occasioned by that process up to the execution of a valid 
contract, at which point new rights and remedies arise out of that 
contract.287 
 
281.  See Eric Mills Holmes, The Four Phases of Promissory Estoppel, 20 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 45, 67-72 (1996): “In contrast, phase three demonstrates that courts use promissory estoppel 
to award reliance damages which equate more with tort damages in restoring the promisee to a 
pre-promise status.  That tort-like restoration is not necessarily paradoxical when courts recognize 
that one branch of promissory estoppel’s family tree lies in tort.”  Id. at 71-72. 
282.  For the sake of conceptual clarity, this Article argues that all gratuitous transfers, even 
those that “fail” because they don’t satisfy all of the formality requirements, should be treated and 
governed by property law and doctrines generated thereby.  It makes little sense to argue that the 
donor has donative intent when successfully attempting to make a gift or testamentary transfer but 
then look for consideration under contract law when the delivery requirement necessary for 
validated gifts is not accomplished. 
283.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
284.  FRIER & WHITE, supra note 3, at 176. 
285.  See, e.g., PERILLO, supra note 63, § 6.3, at 232. 
286.  FRIER & WHITE, supra note 3, at 176. 
287.  Id. 
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The problem with this bright-line approach is that the imposition of a 
strict bright-line approach would lead to behavior that is suboptimal and 
inefficient.  Meaning, if no remedy is awarded for harm created during 
negotiation that does not result in a valid contract, parties will have to alter 
their behavior to eliminate the harm that does occur which will result in 
inefficiencies and an increased cost of contracting. 
A legendary case on point is Drennan v. Star Paving Co.,288 which 
established the remedy of promissory estoppel with the following fact 
pattern: a general contractor (“the general”) receives a low bid from a 
subcontractor (the “sub”) and incorporates the sub bid into its own bid for a 
project.289  At this point, the general has not yet accepted the sub’s bid, and 
under traditional contract law, it can be withdrawn prior to acceptance.290  
The general relies on the sub’s bid and is awarded the contract.291  Either 
before or after the award of the contract to the general (but definitely after 
the bid is submitted and before the sub’s bid is accepted by the general 
contractor), the sub revokes its offer causing injury to the general.292 
Drennan establishes the sub’s liability for that injurious reliance even 
though the general is not bound to accept the bid of the sub.293  This type of 
bidding is efficient and normal for the industry. Failure to hold the sub 
liable would create consequences in the bidding process that could result in 
increased costs and expenses.  Permitting the general to rely on the sub’s 
bid even though the bid has not been accepted (the general cannot accept 
the sub’s bid at this stage since the general has not been awarded the 
contract because the bidding process is ongoing) is rational and customary 
in the construction industry and allowing the sub to rely on contract 
formalities (formal acceptance by the general to make the sub’s offer 
binding) would raise the cost of bidding and ultimately the cost of 
contracting. 
As a result, courts are faced with two alternatives.  First, courts can 
embrace the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo294 and find liability for harms 
created in contract negotiations.  Second, courts can embrace an ad hoc 
approach when efficiency dictates and a find liability during negotiations 
when a remedy can be fashioned at low costs with little or no administrative 
 
288.  333 P. 2d 757 (Cal. 1958). 
289.  Id. at 758-59. 
290.  PERILLO, supra note 63, § 2.6(g). 
291.  Drennan, 333 P. 2d at 758. 
292.  Id. 
293.  Id. at 760. 
294.  FRIER & WHITE, supra note 3, at 176. 
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error.  Obviously, courts have chosen the second alternative for good and 
rational reasons. 
The problem with embracing the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo in 
all contracts is that it improperly shifts the risk or regret contingency to the 
promisor who is the least able to bear it during contract negotiations, and 
would hold him liable for damages or loss incurred by the promisee when 
the promisor cannot control or limit the promisee’s expenditures.  Before 
the parties enter into a contract, the putative promisee has no way to control 
reliance expenditures incurred by the putative promisor during the 
negotiations.  The putative promisee can, however, control its expenditures 
made in reliance during the negotiations.  Furthermore, the same is true 
with respect to costs incurred by the promisor.  Therefore, it is efficient for 
each negotiating party to have incentives to minimize their reliance and 
other costs during negotiations because each will bear the loss if the 
negotiations are fruitless.  Rejecting culpa in contrahendo achieves that 
result. 
Yet, rejecting all claims of loss by a putative promisee as a result of the 
rejection of the doctrine could result in the promisee being exposed to what 
some have characterized as promissory fraud.295  In their article, Professors 
Ayres and Klass describe promissory fraud as situations in which insincere 
promisors intentionally mislead promisees to their detriment by engaging in 
deceptive behavior.296  And although their thesis is agreeable, it can be 
criticized for not defining, except on an ad hoc and ex post basis, when 
promissory fraud is present and actionable by the courts. 
The thesis and contribution herein is that promissory fraud is more 
likely to be provable and found when the promisor has engaged in wrongful 
behavior that is easily measured and remedied ex post.  That is, when the 
reliance damages incurred by the promisee are not speculative or 
approximate but are either precise or fall within a narrow and predictable 
range that is easily known, ascertainable, or foreseeable to the promisor at 
the time that the promissory fraud takes place, it is easier to demonstrate 
and convince the court to find liability. 
A hypothetical involving the general contractor and subcontractor is a 
perfect example of this phenomenon.  Once the subcontractor submits its 
bid to the general contractor it is reasonable that the general contractor will 
rely on that bid in preparing its own bid for the contract, and the amount 
 
295.  Ian Ayres & Gregory Klass, Promissory Fraud Without Breach, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 
507, 508-09 (2004). 
296.  Id. at 515-17 (citing Hoffman v. Red Owl, 133 N.W. 2d 267 (Wisc. 1965)) (as an 
example of promissory fraud). 
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and harm created by the subcontractor’s later repudiation are fixed at the 
time the bid is submitted by the subcontractor to the general contractor.  
The loss created by the subcontractor’s later breach is easily ascertainable 
and provable by comparing the higher cost of the substituted bid to the 
lower cost of the repudiated bid and awarding the difference to the general 
contractor.  The loss is also unavoidable because once the general 
contractor’s bid is accepted for the project the general contractor must 
perform per the terms of that contract or be in breach of that agreement. 
In this ex post setting the court is more likely to grant a remedy when 
the remedy is capable of easy calculation and the court’s confidence in that 
calculation is very high (low error costs).  That scenario is more likely to 
occur in the reliance context when the parties are engaged in a business 
transaction and have reached a point where the negotiations have produced 
an exchange of a promise or mutual promises that fix the scope of the 
promisee’s harms as a result of the insincere promise made by the promisor.  
Again, this allows the court to provide an effective remedy with very low 
error costs. 
Thus, the question in precontractual liability cases is not whether the 
courts should employ the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo thereby 
imposing a rather broad duty of good faith on the negotiating parties, but 
whether the negotiating parties have reached a stage in the negotiation 
where finite promises are exchanged that cause reliance ex ante (at the time 
the parties are negotiating) that later allows a court ex post to award an 
appropriate amount of damages with little risk of making an error.  These 
are prototypical reliance cases and call for the imposition of Section 90 of 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.  Uncompleted donative transfers 
should be adjudicated pursuant to doctrines of property law and public 
policy cases are best addressed either through doctrines of tort law or the 
recognition that these cases call for the imposition of equitable remedies to 
validate otherwise viable public policy doctrines. 
Hence, true promissory estoppel cases (those that are contract-based 
and not the subject of either an aborted gift transaction or the product of 
tortious conduct on the part of the promisor) are enforceable by the courts 
because the harm that is created is easily and accurately measurable by a 
court ex post.  Thus, the only difficult issue in these cases is the “fairness” 
question: is it fair to find an enforceable agreement based on the promisor’s 
promise given the context within which the promise was made and the 
intent of the promisor in making the promise? 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
This Article started by examining the mystery that is the doctrine of 
consideration as currently employed by the courts.  By reexamining its 
normative base, this Article comes to a conclusion that is not new (that 
consideration serves a formal and functional role in contract formation) or 
particularly insightful.  However, by comparing the lack of the 
consideration requirement in gratuitous inter vivos and testamentary 
transfers, this Article emphasizes that the formal and functional role 
theorized by early contract law scholars like Lon Fuller is accurate,297 and 
demonstrates that the functional role played by consideration is important at 
a later stage when the court is called upon to adjudicate the dispute between 
the parties to provide a remedy.  By providing the correct remedial scope, 
consideration allows courts to provide a remedy to the parties at a low cost 
with little attendant judicial error. 
Indeed, by focusing on the remedy provided by the court, this Article 
parses the detrimental reliance cases to posit that only cases involving a 
commercial context should properly be characterized as detrimental reliance 
cases calling for the application of Section 90 of the Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts.  More importantly, the detrimental reliance cases, although 
lacking traditional consideration, are effectively and efficiently enforceable 
by the courts because they are able to accurately measure the cost or 
reliance expended by the aggrieved party. 
Given the absence of an actual contract and the rejection of the culpa in 
contrahendo doctrine in the United States, the promisee’s action taken in 
response to the promise made by the promisor must be reasonable and will 
be policed by the aggrieved promisee because of the uncertainty of his 
recovery in the absence of a formal contract supported by consideration.  In 
other words, the promisee who lacks a formal contract will have a strong 
self-interest in mitigating damages because of the uncertainty associated 
with actually receiving damages from the promisor when there was no 
formal contract.298  As a result, certain promises, even those technically 
lacking in consideration, are enforceable, and rightly so.  Donative promises 
and promises not relied on by the promisee should not be the subject of 
promissory estoppel.  Instead, there are other doctrines of the law better 
suited to adjudicate disputes arising in those contexts. 
 
 
297.  See Fuller, supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
298.  See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General 
Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967 (1983). 
